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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Prevailing economic ideas—and fashions—about 
development have influenced the International 
Development Association (IDA) since its creation in 
1960. The creation of the organization itself is the 
result of two contemporaneous facts: an urgent need 
to channel development finance to least-developed 
countries and an increasing pressure on World Bank 
management to directly address the issue of poverty in 
developing countries. Changing views, over time, have 
been a rationale—and, at times, a justification—for 
emphasizing poverty and social sectors; for providing 
grants to particular groups of countries; and for strategic 
choices and sectoral priorities. IDA has been influential 
This paper is a product of the Research Support Unit, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World 
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at cdenizer@worldbank.org, jdethier@worldbank.org, and agleb@cgdev.org.
in development debates and been an advocate for specific 
views about development policy. This paper gives an 
overview of these views and documents how they have 
shaped the activities of the organization since its creation. 
After a brief review of development thinking and of the 
organization of research at the World Bank, the paper 
documents the shifts that have taken place in country 
allocations and in sector emphasis in IDA over the 
past 50 years and highlights the strategic themes that 
have guided its development agenda: toward increasing 
country selectivity; from projects to programs; from 
conditionality to country ownership of reforms; and from 
input-based to results-based performance.1 
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The report IDA in Retrospect, which was published on the occasion of the 20
th 
anniversary of the institution, makes the point that “IDA’s influence on policy reform, on 
creating viable development institutions, and on general economic and sector analysis is 
perhaps its most important contribution to development in member countries” (World 
Bank 1982, p. 11). The contribution of the International Development Association (IDA) 
to the external and internal accounts of poor countries has always been modest, since it 
has never exceeded 2 percent of total investment, but its influence is much broader. It is 
therefore useful to examine prevailing ideas about development and the influence they 
have had on IDA since its creation in 1960. Prevailing economic views have influenced 
IDA and provided a rationale—and even, at times, a justification—for how loans are 
extended to developing countries; for the sectors to which they are directed; and for the 
emphasis placed on poverty and social sectors.  
A multitude of factors—political, economic and ideological developments in 
developing and donor countries—have influenced the development of IDA and economic 
ideas have also been a major influence. John Maynard Keynes once said that “practical 
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist,” and, in the case of IDA, this has been true 
of all economists, defunct or alive. Their views have, at times, had a significant influence 
on country allocations and sector emphasis as well as on IDA’s business model in 
general.  Moreover IDA—as well as the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD)—provides many opportunities for learning about development, and 
their operations have been an important source of empirical validation for development 
theory and have influenced the direction taken by this field of knowledge.  
Thus the World Bank—because of its ability to learn from its projects and 
policies and because it has nurtured a cadre of good researchers—has been a major 
contributor to development economics through research studies, the collection and 
dissemination of data, and cooperation between researchers and operational staff. Given 
the close connections between IDA and development economics, it is appropriate to 
sketch their parallel history and to understand the main interactions. 




The creation of the International Development Association in 1960 was the result 
of two parallel developments: the need to channel funds to the most underdeveloped 
countries of the periphery, some of which had become newly independent, and the 
increasing pressure on World Bank management from a burgeoning aid community in 
rich countries to address the issue of widespread poverty. 
Until then, the management of the World Bank had narrow views about what it 
should finance and its freedom of action, in any case, was limited by the strictures of 
Wall Street. It chose to finance only so-called productive sectors and to stay away from 
projects that might favor the rural or urban poor.
2  These management views were 
reinforced by an almost universal belief among development economists—from Hans 
Singer to Arthur Lewis to Raul Prebisch—that development was synonymous with 
industrialization and urbanization and that the bulk of investment should go toward non-
agricultural activities.
3   
The World Bank in its early years—in other words, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development—having been undercut by the Marshall Plan 
(announced in June 1947) to finance the reconstruction of Europe, shifted its focus to 
“development loans.” The definition of what constituted “development” was narrow and 
included only productive activities such as industry, mining, shipping and transport, and 
public works. Top management was concerned about establishing the Bank’s reputation 
on Wall Street and the rating of its bonds, and followed conservative financial policies. It 
rejected the idea of “social” loans for activities such as housing, education or even water 
supply to households.
4 The first loan to Latin America was made in March 1947 (to 
Chile) and to Asia in August 1948 (to India). 
Throughout the 1950s and part of the 1960s, the Bank “turned a deaf ear to the 
steady demands from borrowers and the burgeoning aid community for a softer attitude 
to social needs.” 
5  However a certain schizophrenia developed in the Bank.  While on the 
one hand, the Bank chose “to be occupied with the need to meet exacting standards for 
                                                 
2  This is documented in several sources, in particular Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997) and Alacevich (2009) 
3  Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997), pp. 114-120. 
4  Alacevich (2009) gives specific examples for Colombia 
5  Kapur, Lewis, and Webb (1997), p. 142 4 
 
each of its projects,”
6 it was also carrying out broad assessments of its client countries’ 
needs—some of which stressed the extent of poverty and the vast social needs—to 
influence the borrower’s development policies and practices.  Although it fully 
recognized in its studies the need for education, health and social policies to address 
widespread poverty, it insisted on selecting only industry and infrastructure, and not 
social sectors, for its lending activities—essentially arguing that these were not 
productive activities that could directly contribute to the repayment of the loan. 
“Survey missions” carried out by the Bank’s operational staff analyzed the 
policies and practices of underdeveloped countries and made policy recommendations of 
a general nature. These missions produced reports similar to what is now called 
Economic and Sector Work. For example, in July 1951, the Bank made public 
recommendations on the economic development of Guatemala and countless other 
missions took place during the 1950s.  
By contrast, economic analysis was limited to the conduct of financial feasibility 
studies for proposed projects, and research staff was left out of operations altogether, 
particularly since President Eugene Black is said to have paid little attention to their 
economic reports. Internal conflicts between operations (that is, lending and economic 
and sector work) and research arose almost as soon as the institution was created. At that 
time, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan—one of the founders of development economics—was 
Assistant Director of the Economics Department. He argued that it is useless for the Bank 
to be preoccupied with creditworthiness and individual projects. It should calculate the 
aid necessary to sustain a desired growth rate calculated from an assumed capital-output 
ratio and make massive loans on a continuing basis. This advice seemed like nonsense to 
bankers and lawyers in the Bank. Rosenstein-Rodan lost the battle and retreated to the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (where Max Millikan and Walt Rostow worked), 
where his influence expanded greatly: he became an adviser to the Alliance for Progress, 
to the governments of India, Italy, Chile, and the United States and later to Presidents of 
the World Bank since that time. Many of his ideas eventually came to be accepted in the 
Bank, but not for some time.
7 
                                                 
6 Ibid, p. 125 
7  See Oliver (1975) 5 
 
The economics profession was not particularly interested in development at the 
time—reflecting the lack of interest of people in metropolitan countries in this issue. 
Interestingly, all the “founding fathers” of development economics—including 
Rosenstein-Rodan, Lewis, Singer, Hirschmann, Myrdal, Nurske and Prebisch—worked 
for international organizations like the League of Nations, the United Nations or the 
World Bank. They strongly believed in the importance of industrialization. From World 
War II until the creation of IDA, development economics was a discipline in the making. 
It was empirically thin and the articulation of theories was at an early stage.
8  The idea of 
development was synonymous with aggregate growth and industrialization. Social 
considerations and the reduction of poverty were singularly absent from the discussions 
about development. The Australian economist H.W. Arndt, one of the best historians of 
the concept, in his book on Economic Development. The History of an Idea (1987) 
devotes separate chapters to the period 1945-1965 (the chapter is called “Development as 
Growth”) and 1965-1975 (“Social Objectives”). 
Development was equated with growth, and growth was conceived simply as an 
accumulation process as in the Harrod-Domar model and later in the Solow model.9  Both 
models focus on the savings rate and capital-output ratio (v = K/Y) as determinants of the 
growth rate. Solow’s influential model was built around an aggregate production function 
assumed to produce a single good, Y.  The model showed that the long-run growth rate of 
output, s/v, will come into equality with the natural growth rate of the labor force, n, 
through adjustment of the capital-output ratio, v. Increasing the savings rate will increase 
the growth rate in the short run but not the long run because v rises to bring growth back 
to the labor force growth rate n. A higher saving rate s will lead to higher long-run output 
per capita (at least if we ignore the problem of excess saving connected with s being 
permanently above the “golden rule” level). But in these models long-run growth of 
output per capita is possible only if there is technological progress. If that progress is 
labor-augmenting (that is, if it acts on output in a manner analogous to an expansion of 
labor input) at rate a, then it allows long-run growth with s/v = a + n and output per capita 
                                                 
8 See Meier (2005). 
9 See Stern, Dethier and Rogers (2005).  Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) were the first to highlight the 
importance of capital accumulation.  Solow (1956) developed a more sophisticated model of the growth 
process, soon followed by Cass (1965) and many others. 6 
 
growing at rate a. Many development scholars since then have expressed qualms about 
using an aggregate production function with a single good to describe the accumulation 
and technological progress underlying a growth process. Its immediate implications 
include that technological progress is divorced from capital accumulation, higher savings 
does not increase the long-run growth rate, and learning does not occur. Arrow (1962) 
provided a seminal analysis of the economic implications of learning by doing but his 
model had no influence on practical thinking in the development community.
10  
The Harrod-Domar and Solow models may have been useful organizing 
frameworks for asking questions about savings and capital accumulation in rich countries 
dominated by a service sector with lower fixed capital requirements and fairly flexible 
factor markets.  But these models are questionable for developing countries. Even 
endogenous growth models that focus on learning and returns to scale have almost 
nothing to say about structural change and changing behavior—or about institutions, 
governance, and policies, and how poor institutional and governance structures hobble 
the markets for factors, goods, and services—which are issues that are at the core of the 
“urgent problem of economic development.”
11 
Arthur Lewis published in 1954 what has probably became the most influential 
article on development economics, thus inaugurating the dualistic view of development in 
which a traditional and backward sector (agriculture, presumably) can provide an infinite 
supply of labor at a given wage to an incipient modern industrial sector without affecting 
productivity.  It represents a step toward a better understanding of the development 
process. But the empirical validity of his assumption has been questioned by Rosenzweig 
(1988) who shows that, even in densely populated economies, labor supply curves are 
upward sloping.  
All major thinkers, including Lewis, Prebisch and Singer, believed in the need for 
industrialization and dismissed the importance of investment in the agriculture sector, 
                                                 
10 Arrow’s model can produce steady-state growth with no exogenous technical progress. Formally, this 
looks similar to the steady growth rate in an ordinary neoclassical model embodying some increasing 
returns. This particular feature, where learning causes the benefits of investment in human capital to act 
like an externality, characterizes the “new growth theories” (also known as endogenous growth theories) 
that emerged in the late 1980s (see Romer 1986, Lucas 1988, Aghion and Howitt 1992).  
11  The World Economic Report 1948 of the United Nations mentions the need to do something about the 
“urgent problem of economic development of underdeveloped countries.” (cited in Arndt, 1987, p. 49). 7 
 
which was considered backward. During the 1950s, the intellectual discussions opposed 
the partisans of balanced and unbalanced growth, but no-one questioned the primacy of 
industry. 
12  
Although the primacy of investment and industrialization was widely accepted, 
Prebisch (1962) and the Latin American CEPAL school opted for import substituting 
industrialization (ISI), behind high barriers to trade, because of their “export-elasticity 
pessimism,” which largely amounted to the view that, since terms of trade for primary 
products were declining, longer term growth could not be expected from the dependence 
on primary commodity exports.
13  Countries had to develop the manufacturing sector to 
meet domestic demand and, where possible, generate revenues from exports to earn 
enough foreign exchange.
14 By contrast, Asian economies, which developed a national 
vision of development in the 1950 (essentially, South Korea in the aftermath of its war 
with the communist North), championed the advantages of export-oriented 
industrialization. Both export oriented and import substituting types of countries, 
however, were strongly devoted to a dirigiste approach to development complete with 
five-year plans and an array of tax incentives, subsidies, exchange rate policies, tariffs 
and directed credit to help new industries germinate and grow a generation of public and 
private entrepreneurs. 
The views about developing countries during the 1950s were optimistic—with a 
rather touching belief in the possibility to achieve rapid development, especially with 
outside intervention—but also patronizing. For instance the World Bank 1951 report on 
Guatemala mentioned above 
 states that one obstacle to development is the “cultural 
                                                 
12  Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) argued for a ”Big Push” of investment led-growth which would enable an 
economy to loosen multiple constraints, realize scale economies and generate the needed demand. 
Gerschenkron (1962) showed that economic backwardness could be turned to the advantage of late starters 
by means of institutional innovations that enabled them to surmount barriers and exploit the potential 
inherent in catching-up. Nurkse (1959) visualized “balanced growth”, i.e., a mutually supporting advance 
across a broad range of sectors, through a coordinated investment strategy that would propel the economy 
out of poverty. Hirschman (1958) pleaded for “unbalanced growth”, maintaining that leading sectors should 
emerge which would stimulate the rest of the economy with the help of profitable forward and backward 
linkages  (see Yusuf 2008).   
13  CEPAL is the Spanish acronym for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
14 Coatsworth and Williamson (2002) show that from the middle of the nineteenth century, Latin American 
governments had begun relying on tariffs to generate revenues and protect special interests. The import 
barriers erected after the First World War to develop industry were thus an outgrowth of past policies. 
 8 
 
isolation and the defensive attitude of the Indians,” and similar reports on Ceylon state 
that it is the caste system and the “conservative pressure of religious forces,” and on 
Jamaica, “a lack of energy and cooperation.”
15 
Assar Lindbeck summarized economic thinking about developing countries in the 
late 1950s as follows.
 16  “The dominant vision among economists with regard to the 
basic mechanisms of the development process changed considerably during the course of 
the post-World War II period. The main visions during the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s 
have usually been characterized as structuralist—ideas tied to names like Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar Nurkse, Raul Prebisch, Hans Singer and Gunnar Myrdal. The 
term ‘structuralist’ then refers to the notion that the developing countries are 
characterized by genuine inflexibility in the allocation of resources, due to inelasticities 
of supply and demand for goods, services and factors, as well as of productive effort in 
response to changes in economic incentives, such as relative price signals. Based on this 
vision of the development process was the idea of binding constraints on economic 
growth, like the “two-gap” theory of a savings and balance-of-payments constraint, due 
to asserted weaknesses in the response of saving to changes in income and interest rates, 
and of exports, imports and long-term capital movements to changes in exchange rates, 
relative prices and rates of return on productive assets. From these views followed both a 
strong distrust of the price mechanism, and as a mirror image, considerable enthusiasm 
for comprehensive central planning of inputs, outputs and investment activity. 
“Recommendations were prevalent regarding public regulations and interventions 
to increase public saving and investment, the latter often in the form of large-scale 
projects in basic industries in order to deal with indivisibilities and externalities. Heavy 
protection, via direct controls (i.e., licensing) and high tariff barriers were other important 
components of the package of policy recommendations. Although some of these policies 
could certainly be well defended in the early post-World War II period, many 
governments were not flexible enough to shift to more decentralized and less 
interventionist policies when the usefulness of the previous approaches eroded.”  
                                                 
15  Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997), p. 146. 
16  This quote is taken from an evaluation of World Bank research carried out by Lindbeck (1984). 9 
 
The 1960s are considered to be the “golden age” of capitalism, both for 
industrialized countries, which were finally emerging from the post-war period, and for 
developing countries—all of which (with a few exceptions, such as Argentina) were 
starting from a very low base.
17 At no time in past centuries had the world economy 
achieved such a rate of growth and at no time in the past had the leading industrialized 
economies and a few industrializing ones expanded at such spectacular rates for almost 
two decades. Countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Pakistan, Malaysia and the Philippines 
and many others began registering respectable growth rates as new manufacturing 
industries came on stream, and the Green Revolution in agriculture increased yields.  The 
countries that did not grow were victims of extreme predation by dictatorial regimes; 
civil unrest, which stifled economic activity; or extraordinary incompetence on the part of 
inexperienced and rapacious ruling elites.
18  In spite of protectionism, wrong-headed 
trade and exchange rate policies, strong bias against agriculture and in favor of industry, 
white elephant projects and wide-spread corruption (think Mobutu or Marcos)—nothing 
could stop growth in the developing world. 
The mainstream view about the constraints faced by developing countries was 
codified by two economists who would later become Chief Economists at the World 
Bank, Hollis Chenery and Michael Bruno.
 19  The two-gap model formalized and linked 
the domestic and foreign resource needs since it was apparent that growth of developing 
countries was constrained not only by the scarcity of domestic capital, but also by foreign 
exchange to finance purchases of capital goods and other needed intermediate and 
consumption goods.  Many economists interested in development tried (somewhat 
ineffectually) to identify instruments for enhancing saving propensities in order to close 
the gap between a desired investment rate and the rate of domestic savings.   
Throughout the 1960s, development economics helped to dignify and impart 
greater apparent rigor to the efforts of planners and policy makers of all stripes 
throughout the developing world.  In virtually every planning ministry (and countless 
World Bank country reports), the stated objective was to raise growth rates – preferably 
                                                 
17 See Andrew Glynn (2006).  
18  See Olson 2000 and Bates 2008. 
19 Chenery and Bruno 1962.  Hollis Chenery, the Bank’s chief economist from 1972 to 1982 was 
responsible for embedding it into mainstream discourse.   10 
 
to 7 percent per annum so as to double GDP in 10 years – by dint of industrialization and 
to do this through a combination of measures that promoted domestic resource 
mobilization and foreign exchange earnings - or alternatively in the case of relatively 
closed economies, such as China, by minimizing reliance on imports and reducing the 
need for foreign exchange.   
Economics as applied to developing countries was focused on planning, had a 
strong theoretical flavor and little empirical content, and served more to justify existing 
practices than to explain them. As observed by Yusuf (2008), input-output (I-O) 
techniques that used flimsy data and were pressed into use to lend glamour and a measure 
of exactitude to planning at best did no harm. At worst, they created a corset of targets, 
controls and regulations that slowly began stifling economies where planning was king, 
as in the USSR and its satellites, but also countries such as India, which was growing at a 
disappointing rate.  These were heady times for development economics, although its 
contribution to this prosperity was arguably trivial. I-O models, turnpike models, “golden 
rule” models, and other dynamic optimizing models employing mathematical techniques 
borrowed from the engineering sciences and topology celebrated the high growth rates 
and attributed this to advances in economic thinking. Greater access to computers 
coupled with progress in econometrics and software brought a flood of simulation results 
that appeared to light the way forward.  The worth of this modeling and simulation is 
now debatable.  Although the Harrod-Domar model lies at the root of the AK 
 models, the 
current development literature has little use for turnpikes or golden rules or I-O based 
planning, or the large econometric models that attempted to represent the workings of 
economies, although computable general equilibrium (CGE) models remain in use.    
The World Bank—where researchers came mainly from Harvard, Yale and 
Princeton, and a few élite educational institutions in India or Brazil—was actively 
working on Input-Output and Social Accounting Matrix based programming. It built 
some of the largest I-O models in the 1970s and contributed to the writing of the software 
to run these, e.g. GAMS. 
.  Stern and Ferreira (1997, p.556), reviewing research at the 
Bank during those days, remarked, “At one point it seemed as if the solutions to the 
problems of the world were perceived as lying in ever more disaggregated linear 




As mentioned earlier, before 1960, the economics of developing countries was 
very theoretical and focused mainly on planning. Empirical development economics 
began in earnest during the 1960s with Simon Kuznets, who received the Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 1971 for his empirical work on economic growth and the structure and 
process of development.
20 Four main “themes,” which have influenced the discussions 
surrounding the preparation and implementation of IDA operations, can be discerned in 
development thinking.
21 These are: the importance of poverty and how to address this 
challenge; the role of economic incentives and the government vs. markets debate; the 
role of policy advice and its applicability to diverse situations; and the role of openness 
and the import substitution vs. export orientation debate.  IDA has been an active 
contributor to research and has participated as an advocate of specific development views 
in the major ideological debates of the past decades and—being subject to fads and 




During the 1960s, the idea of development became inextricably linked with 
poverty reduction, and this opened a wide field for IDA. Since then, what we could call 
the “economics of poverty reduction” and the other main themes of development thinking 
have strongly influenced IDA operations.  
The colonial powers had been greatly weakened by World War II and the 
reconstruction of Europe was the major enterprise of the 1950s. But by 1960, national 
independence movements—from China to India, Indonesia, Kenya or Central America 
and the Caribbean—had been strengthened; the Soviet Union was in ascendancy after the 
death of Stalin and communism was spreading its influence in the developing world.  In 
                                                 
20 For instance one of the great empirical achievements of the period was the “inverted U-hypothesis” 
formulated by Kuznets linking income growth to its distribution. It was put into question by François 
Bourguignon (another Bank Chief Economist) and other economists in the 2000s, in the light of new 
empirical data for the period 1950-2000. 
21 See Wolfensohn, James, and François Bourguignon. 2004.  Development and Poverty Reduction. 
Looking Back, Looking Ahead. World Bank. Washington, DC.  
 12 
 
the 1960s attitudes changed and became less patronizing toward less developed countries. 
It was difficult to ignore them and the “developing world” (or the “third world,” a term 
coined by the French demographer and economist Alfred Sauvy in 1952)
22 became a 
concept capable of influencing foreign policy and generating institutional responses in 
rich countries. “Economic development emerged as a shared global enterprise, linking 
poor countries that had little in common but poverty, and tying rich and poor through the 
mutual need for security and a growing sense of moral obligation.”
23 
The Cold War—which had begun even before the Korean War, continued with 
the nationalist coups in Egypt and Syria, and was about to deepen with Cuba’s descent 
into communism in 1959 and the Vietnam war—had divided the world in two. 
Developing countries could opt for some variant of the capitalist model, with a greater or 
lesser dose of planning, or with the path being followed by the Soviet Union, China and 
the other socialist economies. In spite of political and economic attempts to avoid 
unavoidable choices, such as the 1955 Bandung conference of nonaligned countries and 
the self-managed enterprises of the “Yugoslav model,” the countries of the Third World, 
by then, belonged—or were about to belong—to the “free world” or to the “Soviet bloc.”  
The creation of IDA in 1960 transformed the nature of the World Bank. As 
Kapur, Lewis and Webb recount in their detailed historical volume,
24 “the addition of 
IDA drew the institution into a whole array of non-self-liquidating fields including those 
of poverty alleviation and the social sectors, as was evident in the way agriculture began 
to take hold as a Bank subject even in the late Black years.”  Since the creation of IDA, 
the World Bank has attempted to link in a unique way its loan and credit operations with 
policy research and studies to inform its clients and staff about broader economic 
developments.  Since then, the work of the Bank has been measured more in terms of the 
successful development of member countries than of the number of projects approved, 
the lack of defaults on past loans, or the rate of return on equity. And development itself 
is measured not only in terms of rising real gross national product but in improved public 
                                                 
22 In the 1980s, Peter Bauer offered a competing definition of the term Third World. He claimed that the 
attachment of Third World status to a particular country was not based on any stable economic or political 
criteria, and was a mostly arbitrary process. The only characteristic that Bauer found common in all Third 
World countries was that their governments "demand and receive Western aid" (the giving of which he 
strongly opposed). See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_World 
23 Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997), p. 143 
24  Ibid., p. 1132  13 
 
health, more equitable income distribution, declining rates of population growth, and 
greater political stability.   
During the 1960s there was an increasing preoccupation with the gap between 
rich and poor countries, and how to reduce it.  Starting in the mid-1960s, under the 
intellectual influence of Singer, Seers and others, the idea of development became less 
and less identified with material growth and more identified with processes of social 
change and poverty reduction.  At the World Bank, the preoccupation with poverty 
reduction accelerated during the 1960s.  It came into focus mainly after President 
McNamara’s 1973 speech at the annual meetings in Nairobi, which emphasized poverty 
eradication as the true goal of development. One focus of research was how to promote 
the redistribution of income in developing countries so as to reduce the crushing burden 
of absolute poverty.   
By the early 1970s, economists had lost confidence in the ability of economic 
growth to be a sufficient means to reduce poverty. There was a growing belief—backed 
by increasing evidence—that growth would not trickle down to the poor. One of the first 
major research efforts to dent trickle down confidence was the 1970 volume by Little, 
Scitovsky and Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries, which linked 
excessive protection and limited job creation.
25 In 1974 the World Bank published 
Redistribution with Growth on policies to improve income distribution and employment, 
providing an intellectual rationale for the approach it was taking in “attacking” poverty 
through a number of production-oriented loans or social loans.   
Poverty considerations were set aside during the long macroeconomic crisis that 
started at the end of the 1970s. The neoliberal perspective that dominated the 1980s 
considered that growth was all that really mattered for welfare outcomes, and that poverty 
and inequality would take care of themselves. Proponents of that view downplayed 
distribution and poverty, and insisted on re-establishing market mechanisms to promote 
economic growth. At the World Bank, funding for research on poverty and income 
distribution peaked in 1975, then declined considerably, reaching almost zero between 
1980 and 1985. 
                                                 
25 Ibid., p. 226. 14 
 
A renewed emphasis on poverty reduction began in 1990. The understanding of 
poverty, under the influence of Sen and others, broadened from a narrow focus on income 
and consumption to a more complex vision of the linkages between growth and poverty 
reduction.  Richer countries tend to have better social indicators.  From this undeniable 
fact, the Bank drew the conclusion that human development promotes income growth and 
income-poverty reduction. Not all economists share this view.
26 
The emphasis on poverty in the 1990s was not new. What was new from the late 
1980s onward was the articulation of a more complete strategy, combining growth with 
delivering social services (education, health and social protection) to the poor. In other 
words, it was the recognition that it was not growth alone that would do it—which was 
implicitly the view of the 1980s.  At the World Bank, the change was spearheaded by the 
1990 World Development Report on Poverty, which included the first standardized global 
estimates of the prevalence of poverty, and by a shift in the institution’s emphasis after 
the arrival of James Wolfensohn as President in 1995. There was an expansion in analytic 
tools and capabilities, in both data and methods, linking micro data to aggregate 
outcomes, and with a view toward assessing policies and programs. This was built on the 
rapid expansion in household survey data production, which started in the mid-1980s.  
Since then, development economics—moving away from macroeconomic 
explanations à la Keynes or Harrod/Domar—has increasingly emphasized the 
microeconomic foundations of development.  Researchers and policymakers have 
realized how crucial micro-level decisions are for economic growth.  Examples are the 
role of women in household decision-making; the effects of the proportion of household 
resources controlled by women on the health and nutrition of their children; the role of 
microeconomics in poorly functioning land, labor, and credit markets; and the role of 
informal networks and institutions in dealing with market failures. The aim of this micro 
development literature is to understand what institutions may arise at the micro level to 
cope with such failures and to structure policy to provide for them. 
                                                 
26 For a dissenting view, see Sudhir Anand and Martin Ravallion, “Human Development in Poor Countries: On 




Recent research, both theoretical and empirical, has emphasized that there need 
not be a trade-off between growth and equity, and that inequality could slow the pace of 
poverty reduction.  Kuznets, Chenery and development economists in the 1970s posited 
that although inequality was undesirable as an end, it was a means to long-run growth, 
because wealthy people tended to save and invest more of their incomes.  The central 
policy challenge for the Bank in the 1970s was to achieve as much growth as possible 
and then to redistribute.  In the 1990s, the view—originating in research described in the 
World Bank’s 2006 World Development Report—changed.  Economists saw that there 
did not necessarily have to be a trade-off between growth and distribution of income. 
Policies aimed at reducing sharp inequalities and equalizing opportunities were having 
positive results for both efficiency and equity. For instance, ensuring access to education 
and health care improves the productivity of the poor, boosting their quality of life and 
potentially the dynamism of society. Access to work opportunities decreases the 
likelihood that people will resort to crime. Because economic power often translates into 
political power, greater equity can underpin a broader targeting of public policy. If well 
executed, measures to equalize opportunities for people to lead productive lives are good 
for consensus, social justice, political stability, and productivity. 
This has led to the view—now shared by most development economists—that the 
economy grows and develops best when the majority of the population can participate in 
and benefit from growth. This view is described at length in the 2006 World Development 
Report on Equity.  Development strategies should aim to reduce sharp inequalities and 
equalize opportunities, and would thus improve both efficiency and equity. 
The Role of Incentives and the State vs. Markets Debate 
 
In most developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, the dogma of planning held 
sway, with its emphasis on pervasive market failure and the need for a highly 
interventionist state. By the 1980s, the neoliberal counterrevolution had taken hold. 
Where the planners saw market failure, the neoliberals saw massive government failure, 
and their response was to move developing-country economies toward unregulated 
markets. “Getting prices right” was the mantra—an important corrective to the planning 
ideas, but equally incomplete as an approach to development. These competing 16 
 
ideologies continued to drive decision-making in many countries even after deeper 
economic analysis and extensive evidence undermined their credibility. The polarization 
of development debates and the lack of rigor in policy analysis did little to further the 
cause of poverty reduction.  
In the 1990s, the development community largely moved beyond the twin dogmas 
of pervasive state control (1960s–1970s) and unregulated markets (1980s–early 1990s). 
The latter half of the decade witnessed the gradual consolidation of a consensus that 
states and markets are in fact complementary. Private enterprise operating through the 
market is the main engine of sustained economic growth. But keeping that engine running 
and ensuring that it powers poverty reduction require a state that is active in two key 
areas. First, government needs to ensure that the business climate is conducive to growth. 
Second, government needs to invest in and empower its people, particularly poor people 
who might otherwise be excluded, through education, health, social protection, and 
mechanisms for encouraging voice and participation. Without broad participation and 
more human capital, growth is unlikely to be fast and sustainable—because excluding 





With the dogmas of the state-market debate came an insistence on “mono-causal” 
explanations of development. This led to one-size-fits-all policy approaches, as the 
general models left little room for actual conditions. When mainstream development 
thinking discarded one model in favor of another, the result was too often major changes 
in policy recommendations without room for nuance. The most recent (but certainly not 
most simplistic) manifestation of this was the “Washington Consensus” at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Its list of preconditions for growth encapsulated many neoliberal precepts in 
what was often interpreted as a neat recipe for development. Perhaps unfairly, that 
consensus came to stand for a package of measures aimed largely at getting the 
government out of the economy—and it was applied with excessive uniformity across 
countries. 17 
 
Common sense tells us that no one approach will work everywhere, since the 
binding constraints to development are unlikely to be the same across countries. 
Development theory is catching up with this view. Even under the simpler earlier models, 
outcomes of policies depended on the parameters assumed for a given country. But the 
case for country specificity received a boost in the late 1980s and 1990s, as a flowering 
of theoretical work on new multiple-equilibrium and endogenous-growth models 
emphasized initial conditions.  
Take trade restrictions and import-substituting industrialization. The new 
pragmatic consensus now justifiably advocates more liberal trade regimes for most 
countries—but recognizes that the costs of following an import-substitution 
industrialization strategy varied with the country’s characteristics. In large economies 
with access to foreign technology and equipment, competition and economies of scale 
moderated the inefficiency cost of trade restrictions. At least in earlier decades, India, 
China, and Brazil were able to develop manufacturing with fairly closed domestic 
economies, and some became internationally competitive. But in small countries such as 
Jamaica, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay in the 1960s and 1970s, the market was too small, and 
any benefits of inward-looking industrialization were swamped by the costs. Sri Lanka 
began to grow only after it turned toward export-oriented policies in 1977.  
Institutional variation also shapes policy outcomes. In Japan during the Meiji 
period, and more recently in Korea, public institutions narrowed interest-group pressures, 
at least enough that they did not block development. Public enterprises were run 
efficiently and built capacity in sectors that paved the way for private investment. 
Although governments played a role in allocating credit and foreign exchange, they did 
so more heavily on the basis of performance than is typical in other countries. But in 
Bolivia, Zambia, and other countries, where public enterprises and allocations were 
captured and used for patronage, the same strategies undermined industrialization.  
Country specificity means that the key is addressing the binding constraints for 
growth at the right time in the right way, not adopting any one-size-fits-all policy 
packages. Identifying the most binding constraints and the best policy mechanisms to 
overcome them certainly is not obvious, putting a premium on sound analysis and the 




The crises of the 1990s and 2000s highlight the importance of prudent 
macroeconomic management, whether to control booms or to reduce vulnerabilities. 
Development policy has had to adapt to the deepening of cross-country 
interdependencies—to what is usually called “globalization.” Economic integration on a 
grand scale is nothing new: cross-border flows of labor and capital in the 19
th and early 
20
th centuries were impressively large, with European bond investors financing much of 
the railroad infrastructure in the Americas, to take one example. But the recent 
globalization trends are exceptional in three main ways. First, the costs of transporting 
goods across borders are now far lower, which, thanks to trade liberalization, has boosted 
trade flows at rates far faster than global income growth. Second, information, including 
new technologies, now flows instantaneously around the globe in quantities unimagined 
in earlier decades. Third, as demonstrated during the present global crisis, portfolio 
capital can now move extremely rapidly into and out of a larger number of emerging 
markets in response to changes in local conditions or investor sentiment.  
These changes offer new opportunities to developing countries, for example by 
allowing them to become integrated into global production chains. But they also bring 
new risks and vulnerabilities, particularly to poor countries. Stronger links between 
economies mean that shocks in industrialized or rapidly growing countries can be 
transmitted to smaller countries less well-equipped to cope with them. The ripple effects 
of the East Asian and Russian crises of the late 1990s and the financial crisis of 2008-
2009 demonstrated this all too well. Similarly, trade and aid can benefit poor countries, 
but unexpected drops in either—perhaps caused by economic decline in rich countries or 
new waves of protectionism—will have destabilizing effects on their economies. Such 
shocks could drag many poor countries back below the threshold of sustainable debt. 
Poor countries also suffer from migration barriers and credit constraints that keep 
unskilled labor from flowing out, while highly educated people exit freely and in large 
numbers. 
Globalization brings other “public bads.” Among them is the damage that 
economic growth inflicts on the environment, both in developed and developing 
countries, particularly through greenhouse gas emissions. Breaches in security are also 19 
 
being felt as a global public bad, and the imbalance of global development has been 
blamed for it. It is certainly difficult to trace all international security problems directly to 
economic development issues, but the links are obvious in several instances: national 
conflicts spilling over to neighbors and forcing foreign intervention, and failed states 
threatening global stability.   
Policy Research at the World Bank 
 
Economic research at the World Bank started in earnest at the time of the creation 
of IDA during the presidency of George Woods (1963-68). Irving Friedman was brought 
to the Bank from the IMF—as Director of Economic Research and Economic Adviser to 
the President. Woods and Friedman provided the rationale for the concessionary aid 
program and helped to make the Bank the world’s foremost development agency. 
Andrew Kamarck became Director of the Economics Department.
27  In four years, 
Friedman and Kamarck recruited more than 200 social scientists, mainly Ph.D. 
economists,
28 and sought additionally to have economic analysis carried out within area 
departments as well as the Economics Department.  
But it was Hollis Chenery, a leading Harvard economist who had been assistant 
administrator for the USAID program and succeeded Friedman in 1970, who gave 
development policy research its central role in the Bank.  Chenery’s focus was on producing 
quantitative research and statistical work on the growth and distribution of national 
income and the structure and process of development.  Chenery was particularly influential 
in advising McNamara on how to promote the redistribution of income in developing 
countries so as to reduce the crushing burden of absolute poverty.  During the same period, 
Bank research staff also produced quantitative forecasting and planning models (such as 
general equilibrium models). Since Chenery joined the Bank, “in general, World Bank 
economists have become leading contributors to development research, and the Bank is better 
                                                 
27  Friedman and Kamarck had worked on the Bretton Woods proposals at one time or another within the US 
government, and had expertise in both theoretical and applied economics.  Woods was eager to transform the 
Bank from a bank to a development finance agency and felt that he needed the assistance of an economics staff 
in order to do that. He is reported to have said, “I don't think you can have a development agency unless it has as 
its fuselage the loans which are being made, but one wing has to be project work and the other wing has to be 
economics.” (Oliver 1975) 
28  The Young Professionals Program had been created in June 1962. 20 
 
able on that account to deal with the development priorities of the world.”
29 In his 1970 
speech to the Board of Governors in Copenhagen, the President of the Bank addressed the 
question of what needed to be known to be able to do good lending and advisory work in 
developing countries: 
We do not want simply to say that rising unemployment is a “bad  thing,” and something 
must be done about it. We want to know its scale, its causes, its impact and the range of 
policies and options which are open to governments, international agencies and the private 
sector to deal with it. 
We do not want simply to sense that the “green revolution” requires a comparable social 
revolution in the organization and education of the smaller farmer. We want to know what 
evidence or working models are available on methods of cooperative enterprise, of 
decentralized credit systems, of smaller-scale technology, and of price and market 
guarantees. 
We do not want simply to deplore over-rapid urbanization in the primary cities. We want 
the most accurate and careful studies of internal migration, town-formation, decentralized 
urbanism and regional balance.
30 
 
In the fall of 1972, the Bank underwent a re-organization. Most sector issues were the 
responsibility of the Central Projects Staff (CPS), while most broad questions of development 
policy were to be addressed by the Development Policy Staff (DPS), known as the 
“Economics Department,” given responsibility for macroeconomic research. Hollis Chenery 
became the first Vice President for Development Policy.
 A comprehensive review of research 
in the Bank was carried out by Bela Balassa in 1971 and a Research Committee was 
established to advise the President in shaping the Bank’s research program.  
An important vehicle to disseminate the Bank’s views on development, to mobilize 
official development assistance and to win adherence for a renewed push for development is 
the annual World Development Report, which appeared for the first time in 1978. The intense 
interest aroused by a paper on global trends and the prospects for developing countries issued 
in 1974 by Hollis Chenery encouraged McNamara to pursue the idea of an annual publication 
that took the pulse of the international economy, stimulated the search for answers, and 
synthesized the consensus view.   
In 1982, A.W. Clausen replaced R. McNamara as President, and Anne Krueger 
replaced Hollis Chenery. The Development Policy Staff became the Economics Research 
Staff (ERS) and, shortly thereafter, Anne Krueger became the new Vice President, 
Economics and Research.  Research on basic development issues was concentrated within 
ERS in the Development Research Department (DRD). Simultaneously, the Central Projects 
                                                 
29 Oliver (1975) 
30 Mason and Asher (1973), p. 476-477. 21 
 
Staff was reshaped as the Operational Policy Staff (OPS) whose mandate was, among other 
things, to conduct applied policy research in close collaboration with operational staff. 
Within OPS, the Country Policy Department was to act as the “applied counterpart” of the 
Development Research Department. Within the Economic Research Staff (ERS), the 
Development Research Department (DRD) was responsible for macroeconomic research.  
The Central Projects Staff became known as Operations Policy Staff (OPS), with 
responsibility for research on sector and micro topics.  
The new Vice President and her team reorganized research at the Bank. Prior to the 
reorganization, the “Economics Department” (DPS) accounted for 70 percent of Bank 
research expenditures, with the remaining 30 percent being in Operations. The reorganization 
would change this balance radically: after the reorganization, more than one-half of Bank 
research would be located in and managed by departments in Operations. By 1983, research 
resources were shifted toward operations: research resources controlled by ERS dropped to 
slightly below 50 percent. Research funds were concentrated in a few large cross-country 
comparative research projects with several small projects.  Anne Krueger and the Research 
Policy Council, which advised her, also established a Research News Bulletin and the two 
journals, the World Bank Research Observer (WBRO) and the World Bank Economic Review 
(WBER)—the news bulletin and the WBRO targeting the widest range of readers interested 
in development, and the WBER intended for economists.  
Under Anne Krueger’s leadership, research moved away from what was 
characterized as “engineering economics” with its emphasis on large-scale quantitative 
forecasting and planning models, toward studies that emphasized factual behavioral 
patterns.
31 This shift implied greater emphasis on research oriented toward making policy and 
less toward understanding what would happen in an optimizing society where all regulations 
could be exogenously imposed and costlessly enforced; it represented a departure from large 
modeling enterprises for planning and forecasting and a reorientation toward studies of how 
individuals, institutions and governments behave in different economic environments. Policy 
research was primarily carried out through a series of large-scale studies of major 
development issues, each built on in-depth comparative analysis of 20 or so country 
experiences. The Comparative Studies Program dominated the course of centrally funded 
                                                 
31  This is the language used in the evaluation of World Bank research by Assar Lindbeck, Director of the 
Institute of International Economics in Stockholm, presented in the 1984 Annual Report on the World Bank 
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research for most of the 1983 through 1987 period and was the principal mechanism used by 
the Research Policy Council to translate research priorities into action.  
In 1987, as Barber Conable succeeded A.W. Clausen as President, a Policy, Planning 
& Research (PPR) complex was created to integrate policy and research. PPR encompassed, 
inter alia, Development Economics (DEC), Sector Policy & Research, and Strategic Planning 
& Review.  Stanley Fischer succeeded Anne Krueger as Chief Economist. An informal 
review of the Bank’s research portfolio and research program was conducted at the time of 
the reorganization by Bela Balassa, who had written the report leading to the creation of the 
Research Committee in 1971. The 1988 research report sent by Stan Fischer to the Board 
states that, “The Bank’s research program continues to evolve as priorities change […]. 
During the late 1960s and the 1970s, concern about distributional issues and poverty strongly 
influenced the direction of Bank research. In the early 1980s, […] as interest in policy-based 
lending increased [because of] global economic conditions, so too did the demand for 
research on macroeconomic and international issues. Although a large component of the 
research program continued to be devoted to analyzing the problems of the poor and the ways 
of alleviating poverty, the problems of structural adjustment and stabilization generally 
overtook distributional concerns to become the dominant issues facing many of the Bank’s 
clients.  Four patterns in the makeup of the research budget since the early 1980s are 
noteworthy: (1) the rising share of departmentally approved research, (2) the rising share of 
research on macroeconomic and international issues, (3) the move toward small and very 
large projects, and (4) the scant involvement of the regional staff in research.” These four 
features do not seem to have changed much in the past 30 years. Stan Fischer created three 
new instruments: the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE), the 
Visiting Research Fellows program and the Research Capacity-Building Grants to research 
institutes in developing countries.  
The Bank adopted its current matrix structure at the 1997 reorganization.
32  Six 
Networks were established to bring sector expertise, multi-country experience and research to 
bear on operations and policies.  In 2006, the Bank consolidated the six Networks into 
four. Research was consolidated under the Chief Economist and Vice President for 
Development Economics and the new Vice Presidency became known as Development 
                                                 
32  Thematic Vice Presidencies for policy guidance, operational support and dissemination of best practice 
to operations—the forerunners of the Networks—had been established in October 1992. Regional 
Technical Departments were made smaller and the sector operations divisions were strengthened.   23 
 
Economics (DEC). Michael Bruno was appointed Vice President in September 1993, 
replacing Lawrence Summers, who left the Bank in January 1993. DEC had responsibility for 
micro and macro-economic research and conducted a significant share of sector studies.  
The Country Economics Department (renamed Policy Research and, later, DEC 
Research Group) became the principal research arm of the World Bank—covering the 
full range of issues relevant to development policy in the Bank’s member countries—
during Nancy Birdsall’s tenure (1991-1993).
33  In 1992 the Bank began publishing 
synthetic reports aimed at summarizing research findings to provide the basis for sound 
policy advice on specific topics—known later as Policy Research Reports (PRRs).  The 
first two reports were The East Asian Miracle and Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results 
and the Road Ahead, both carried out under the general direction of Nancy Birdsall.  The 
third report, Averting the Old Age Crisis, was initiated by Lawrence Summers and Nancy 
Birdsall and carried out under the general direction of Michael Bruno and Lyn Squire.  
Since then, 14 more reports have been published.
34 
Today the World Bank is considered to be the leading intellectual institution in 
development and a world leader in a number of important research areas, including poverty 
measurement, delivery of social services, impact evaluation and measurement of 
development outcomes.
35  Bank research is resolutely oriented toward policy.  Researchers 
play a crucial role in both learning from past policies and thinking critically about future 
policies.  Without research, the conceptual foundations for policy making would be weak; 
there would be very little new knowledge or data to inform policy decisions; there would be 
little or no innovation; and we would know too little about what succeeds and what fails in 
                                                 
33  The department has had four directors after Nancy Birdsall: Lyn Squire (1993-1996); Paul Collier 
(1998-2003); Alan Winters (2004-2007) and Martin Ravallion (since September 2007). 
 
34 The East Asian Miracle (1992); Adjustment in Africa (1993); Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994); 
Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership (1995); Private Capital 
Flows (1996); Confronting AIDS: Public Priorities in a Global Epidemic (1997); Assessing Aid: What 
Works, What Doesn’t and Why? (1998);  Greening Industry (1999); Trade Blocs (2000); Engendering 
Development (2000); Finance for Growth (2001); Globalization, Growth and Poverty (2001); Breaking the 
Conflict Trap (2003); Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction (2003); Reforming Infrastructure: 
Privatization, Regulation, and Competition  (2004); At Loggerheads? Agricultural Expansion, Poverty 
Reduction and Environment in the Tropical Forests (2005); Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in 
Expanding Access (2007) and Conditional Cash Transfers (2009). 
 
35 These are the conclusions of a 2006 evaluation report, prepared by a panel headed by Angus Deaton and 
comprising some 25 world-renowned development economists, asked to assess the relevance and quality of 
Bank research.  24 
 
the fight against poverty.  Without research, failed policy orthodoxies would often persist 
without the critical inspection needed to show that they have failed and successful policies 
would be dropped for the wrong reasons.    
In recent years, the World Bank research program has increasingly been involved in 
two broad cross-cutting types of research: evaluative research and methodological research.
36 
Evaluative research rigorously assesses whether development policies are effective, and 
under what circumstances they tend to be more effective.  This embraces both “micro” 
interventions in specific sectors and macro policies.  The second type of cross-cutting 
research that has increasingly occupied Bank research in the past decade can be termed 
methodological research. The Bank has become a major producer of development data, and a 
number of the Bank’s most successful data initiatives started as research projects.  The best 
example is probably the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), which started as a 
research project in the mid-1980s with the aim of greatly improving household survey data in 
developing countries. The LSMS database now houses more than 75 LSMS datasets with all 
the relevant documentation. The World Bank is also a leader in governance indicators: 
enterprise surveys (also known as Investment Climate surveys), and Purchasing Power Parity 
measurement through the International Price Comparison Project. 
Shifts in Country Allocations, 1961 ­ 2010 
 
Before the early 1990s, with a few exceptions (such as P.T. Bauer), the economic 
literature on the effectiveness of aid in general, and IDA in particular, was inconclusive 
and consisted mostly of general studies and cross-country regressions.
37  Initial cross-
country results, which emphasized growth to reduce poverty based on the Washington 
consensus, sound fiscal and monetary policies, openness, liberalization of markets and 
deregulation. However, as it has been difficult to find robust evidence from cross-country 
data that the policy prescriptions of the Washington consensus – hence, aid based on 
those - generate growth, subsequent empirical work by researchers from the World Bank 
                                                 
36 See Martin Ravallion, “Research in Practice at the World Bank,” DECRG, September 2007. 
37  The most well known was probably the 1986 volume by Robert Cassen (who had been the main author 
of the 1981 World Development report), Does Aid Work?  Oxford: Clarendon Press 
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and elsewhere have laid out more nuanced positions (Besley and Burgess 2003, Easterly 
and Serven 2003, Aghion and Howitt 2009). 
Starting in the late 1980s, the idea of selectivity began to take shape. In 1998 the 
Bank published a Policy Research Report, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, 
and Why, which turned out to be very influential, arguing that foreign aid would have a 
greater impact on poverty reduction if it were focused on poor countries with stronger 
economic institutions and policies. The recognition that the effects of aid depended 
heavily on the environment was a major step forward. Subsequent work by Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) has reinforced this finding and since then there has been an explosion of 
empirical work in this area. On the one hand, some researchers have challenged the 
robustness of these results (Hansen and Tarp, 2001, Easterly and Levine, 2003, and Rajan 
and Subramanian, 2008).  Some studies, on the other hand, tend to find a beneficial effect 
of aid, differing primarily on how much the beneficial results depend on the environment, 
especially over a longer period (Minoiu and Reddy, 2009). On this point, case-study 
evidence seems more consistent with the Assessing Aid argument.  However, as pointed 
out by Temple (2010), empirical work based on cross-country data remains work in 
progress and this line of research is best at providing a signpost for more focused work 
(Besley and Burgess, 2003).   
A second major advance has been the recognition that successful development 
assistance requires a conducive political economy in the recipient country. The failure of 
many structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, whether because of flawed design or 
poor implementation, underlined the country ownership of reforms. Empirical evidence 
suggested strongly that conditions on loans—that is, promises of future reforms—were 
far less reliable as guides to the borrower’s reform commitment than past actions. As a 
result, the extensive use of conditionality fell out of favor with development thinkers.
  
New studies provided evidence that aid was highly fungible: foreign aid to one sector 
often had the effect of financing investments in another sector on the margin, because the 
recipient government could redeploy its own resources from the first sector to the second, 
undermining the intent of the donor. For development assistance to make a positive 
contribution, therefore, it was necessary that the broader public expenditure program be 26 
 
consistent with development aims. It no longer sufficed to ensure that a single project 
was well designed and implemented. 
Both advances in thinking would have the effect of shifting development 
resources from countries with poor policies, institutions, and governance to those with 
better environments for growth, and were further reinforced by influential papers of 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Hall and Jones (1999).  Both papers have 
shown that institutions and government policies determine the economic environment 
within which individuals accumulate skills and firms accumulate capital and produce 
output and are the main determinants of growth. Physical and human capital as well as 
prudent monetary and fiscal policies are “proximate” but institutions are “fundamental” 
determinants (Acemoglu, 2009). Although developing institutions or supporting countries 
to do so has strong economic justification, it raises a troubling question: What could the 
development community do to help the hundreds of millions of people living in the 
countries with the poorest aid environments? More recent work has begun to address this 
question, and while it is too early to assess whether that work will bear fruit, merely 
putting the question squarely on the development research agenda is a major advance. A 
particular challenge for IDA and the development community in general is how to 
support institutional development through policy advice. As noted by Rodrik (2007), 
first-order economic principles (protection of property rights, market-based competition, 
appropriate incentives, sound money, and so on) do not map into unique policy packages. 
The same question is valid for aid allocation. What is the appropriate or 
reasonable basis to allocate scarce concessional aid resources? This question has received 
considerable attention in the development community. The approach of IDA, drawing on 
lessons from the past and influenced by changing development thinking and donor views 
(which have often influenced IDA during replenishment negotiations), has evolved over 
time. Initially needs-based—with needs proxied by income per capita and population in 
the early 1960s—the allocation of IDA funds has become increasingly based on 
performance.  As noted by Stern, “too often, during the Cold War, aid allocations were 
driven by geopolitical aims rather than by poverty reduction goals.”  To counter the 
politicization of aid, IDA first introduced selectivity to inter-country allocations in its 
allocation system; then, during IDA’s 12
th replenishment negotiations, it gave more 27 
 
prominence to governance ratings. This was a conscious political decision that followed 
the end of the Cold War.  
The current performance-based allocation (PBA) system uses Country 
Performance Ratings (CPR) largely based on its Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA), a yearly assessment of policies and institutions by IDA and IBRD 
country teams along 16-point criteria grouped into four clusters.
38 The cluster that 
evaluates performance in governance accounts for 68 percent of the weight and the other 
three clusters—macro management, structural policies, and social policies—have a 
weight of 24 percent of the total.
39  An assessment of portfolio performance also enters 
into the formula with a weight of 8 percent. Then the CPR is raised to its 5
th power and 
multiplied with population and GDP per capita raised to a negative power (-0.125) to 
direct more IDA resources to its poorer members out of equity considerations.  With such 
a complex formula, IDA attempts to balance needs and performance.  However there are 
also exceptional allocations for post-conflict countries, debt sustainability, regional 
projects, arrears clearance, and re-engaging countries. Yet allocations are highly selective 
and countries scoring high can expect to receive six to seven times the per capita 
allocation of low-scoring countries (World Bank 2001).  
The document “Enhancing IDA’s Performance Based Allocation System” 
(prepared for the IDA13 replenishment negotiations) mentions that a country’s quality of 
governance can be seen as a proxy for its ability to effectively use additional funding, or 
absorptive capacity. The IDA12 discussions focused on the sharply reduced absorptive 
capacity of a number of countries in which a minimal level of governance was lacking 
and IDA12 introduced a governance discount on the overall rating, based on the 
country’s performance with respect to seven governance criteria (six are part of the 
CPIA6; one is part of the ARPP and concerns the procurement process).  The discount 
works as follows: criteria are rated on a scale from 1 (low) to 6 (high). If three or more of 
the seven governance criteria are rated 2.0 or lower, a governance discount of one-third is 
applied to the country’s overall IDA Performance Rating. Since the allocation formula 
                                                 
38   For a useful description of the CPIA, see Kanbur 2005.  
39  The weight of the portfolio implementation experience was increased at the time of IDA12 from 7 to 
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more or less squares the performance rating, the allocation impact of the discount is even 
greater, reducing the country allocation by some 50 percent.  Donors and IDA Deputies 
later expressed satisfaction that the governance discount mechanism had achieved a 
number of objectives: (i) signaling concerns about weak governance; (ii) making 
governance a key focus of country dialogue and policy reform; and (iii) sharply reducing 
the allocation of funds in cases of weak governance, where there was a significant risk 
that IDA resources would not be effectively used. As a result, the ratio of average per 
capita allocations to countries in the top and bottom quintiles was nearly doubled, from 
2.3 when the original rating was used, to 4.2 when the governance discount was applied. 
Both the changing thinking on development as well as political factors affected 
the evolution of the PBA.  Initial allocations were mostly based on “needs” and lack of 
capital and savings in poor countries, as emphasized by two gap models, while later 
allocations were affected by factors related to governance. This is in line with recent 
academic research which emphasizes institutional development; but it can be criticized 
on several fronts. There is no empirical grounding, for example, for the weights attached 
to its clusters or for the overweighting of its governance cluster, which was a political 
decision. Ratings along CPIA’s 16 criteria have also been criticized as subjective and it is 
clear that the PBA is not a perfect rationing mechanism. It nevertheless is a transparent 




During the past 50 years, there were several shifts in what were considered 
priority sectors for IDA.  As recounted earlier, there was a first shift in the 1960s from 
“brick-and-mortar” and infrastructure projects toward a broader range of areas in 
McNamara’s time, including social sectors, in large part because of the Bank’s focus on 
poverty.  This has continued, with perhaps greater emphasis on poverty and some 
inclusion of gender – but this is seen also as an issue of production efficiency. 
Agriculture was always high on IDA’s agenda. This was modified in the early 1990s, as 
this sector lost its status because of low global prices and also due to poor performance of 29 
 
traditional projects in the more liberalized agricultural sectors. The priority sectors 
became health, education, and social assistance—or broadly speaking, human 
development.  Infrastructure continued to be important but lost to “soft” sectors during 
the 1990s.  There was also an increased interest in public-private partnerships and 
instruments to “crowd in” private infrastructure funding.   
These sector shifts are shown in the table below, which presents the breakdown of 
IDA grants by sector of activity over the 50-year period.
40 Six major trends are 
noticeable. 
  The importance of agriculture and rural development increases steadily until the 
early 1980s and then gradually declines.  It seems to have stabilized over the past 
decade at about 9 percent of total disbursements. 
  Infrastructure—including electric power and energy, roads and transport, and 
telecommunications—which amounted to more than 40 percent of total IDA loans 
during the 1960s, has always been important but declined during the 1970s and 
1980s and since the early 1990s has hovered around 20 percent of total grants.  
  Grants for industry have accounted for about 5 percent of the total.  This included 
a number of industrialization projects in the first years of IDA. It also includes an 
(almost constant) number of projects in mining and extractive industries, major 
export revenue earning activities in many poor countries. There were two highs of 
10 and 13 percent, respectively, in the first part of the 1970s (probably explained 
by a large number of newly independent nations) and the first part of the 1990s in 
transition countries for industrial and financial restructuring projects. 
  Social sectors—including education, population, health and nutrition, and social 
protection—increased from 6 percent in the early 1960s to 17 percent in the early 
1990s, and reached a high of 30 percent in 2000-2005, declining slightly to 28 
percent in the last 5 years. 
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  “Social infrastructure” which includes mostly water, sewerage and sanitation as 
well as a number of urban activities (housing and others), from the late 1970s 
until today represents a respectable 6-8 percent of the IDA portfolio.  The largest 
number of grants is for water and sewerage in the growing urban shantytowns of 
poor countries. 
  Grants for governance projects, which include public administration and law, 
have experienced the most remarkable progression.  The category did not even 
exist until the 1980s.  Since then, they have grown from zero to 25 percent of the 
total IDA portfolio in the last 5 years. 
  OPERATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION BY SECTOR  (in percent of total credits)
1961‐70 1971‐76 1977‐82 1984‐90 1991‐95 1996‐2000 2001‐05 2006‐10
    Agriculture & Rural Dev 23 32 42 34 23 14 9 9
Energy 681 6 1 1 7889
Transport 30 17 10 13 12 12 11 12
Telecomm 55331111




    Industry 41 0861 39 5 4
Education 656691 2 1 2 1 3
Pop, health & nutrition . 1 1 2 8 1 31 81 5
    Social Sectors 66781 7 2 5 3 0 2 8
Governance . . . 2 14 18 24 25
Nonproject lending 2 3 1 8 7.....










As mentioned earlier, the Bank did not put any emphasis on agriculture during the 
1950s because it viewed industry as the engine of development, comforted in this respect 
by the views of all important development economists (from Arthur Lewis, to Albert 
Hirschman to Walt Rostow) who felt that “traditional agriculture was the sector from 
which resources of some kind needed to be extracted on behalf of industrialization.”
41  
This changed completely during the 1960s under the Presidency of George Woods and 
even more so during the 1970s under Robert McNamara. Agriculture was a key 
preoccupation for IDA and other DAC donors—and, of course, for developing country 
governments—from the 1960s until the early 1980s but it gradually disappeared from the 
development agenda for almost 20 years, only to reappear in the first decade of the 21
st 
century.  A symbolic date for the “reappearance” of the sector in the consciousness of the 
international community was the publication date of the 2008 World Development Report 
on Agriculture.  Agriculture had not been a focus of the World Development Report since 
1982.  
Agriculture is important for economic growth as well as for poverty reduction. In 
poor countries, the agricultural sector is large in terms of both aggregate income and 
share of the total labor force—not only for the overall population but for the poor in 
particular. Today the sector accounts for 25 percent of GDP in low-income countries and 
9 percent in middle-income countries (but only 1 percent in high-income countries) and, 
in agriculture-based countries (i.e., those in which agriculture accounts for more than a 
third of overall growth), 65 percent of the labor force is employed in agriculture. 
Agriculture is the main source of livelihood for 86 percent of rural households (which 
themselves represent 55 percent of the population of developing countries). Some 75 
percent of poor people still live in rural areas and derive the major part of their income 
from the agricultural sector and related activities.  
The major intellectual influence when the Bank began to increase its lending 
came from T.W. Schultz whose 1964 book Transforming Traditional Agriculture had a 
profound influence on the profession in general. Contrary to the view that peasants in 
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poor countries were “traditional,” Schultz considered that they were rational decision-
makers and maximized the return from their resources. Their apparent unwillingness to 
innovate, he argued, was rational because governments of those countries often set 
artificially low prices on their crops and taxed them heavily. In other words, peasants 
respond to incentives. Empirical support for this view was overwhelmingly produced 
(much later) in a multi-country study on the Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing 
Policy, led by Anne Krueger, Maurice Schiff and Alberto Valdès. The study 
demonstrated that price policy, trade policy and exchange rate policy in virtually all 
developing countries have discriminated against agriculture, either directly through food 
subsidies or taxes on agricultural exports, or indirectly through manufacturing protection 
and exchange rate overvaluation.
42 The study was recently updated, under the direction of 
Kym Anderson, and reached the same conclusions.
43 Since the mid-1980s many 
developing countries have undertaken a great deal of policy reform and opened to trade. 
The inter-sector bias against agriculture and the antitrade bias have been reduced 
substantially. Developing countries have benefited proportionately more (relative to 
GDP) than high-income economies from those trade-related policy reforms, and they 
would gain nearly twice as much as those richer economies by completing that reform 
process – with 72 percent of the prospective gains to developing countries coming from 
agricultural and food policy reforms. In developing countries, net farm income 
(agricultural value added) is estimated to have been 5 percent higher in 2004 than it 
would have been without the reforms since the mid-1980s. And if policies remaining in 
2004 were removed, that net farm income would rise by another 6 percent (far more than 
the proportional gain to nonagricultural households). These reforms could further 
alleviate global inequality and poverty, since three-quarters of the world’s extreme poor 
are in farm households in developing countries. One way to look at the policy changes of 
the past 25 years is to say that developing countries follow the example of higher-income 
countries in moving from anti- to pro-farmer policies as they develop. The Anderson 
study shows that import-competing farmers in developing countries are being 
increasingly protected over time.  
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One factor responsible for the emphasis on agriculture was the concern about 
“feeding the world population,” and especially the most populous nation at the time, 
India. South Asia experienced two major droughts in 1965-66 and 1966-67 and food aid 
shipments to India alone amounted to 10 million tons per year.
44 At that time, the “Green 
Revolution” began and, under funding and leadership from the Rockefeller and Ford 
Foundations, dramatic improvements were achieved in plant breeding, especially for 
maize in Mexico, rice in the Philippines, and wheat in the Punjab. The World Bank, 
which soon jumped on the bandwagon, has sometimes been accused of taking too much 
credit for the Green Revolution.
45 But whatever its role, it remains the case that there was 
a rapid expansion of IDA credits (and IBRD lending). About half of the credits went to 
irrigation and drainage (on which the Green Revolution relied); between 10 and 15 
percent went to agricultural credit; and a sizeable share (7.7 percent in the 1960s, 
increasing to 18-20 percent in the 1970s and 1980s) went to “area development,” i.e., 
rural development. 
Agricultural production grew fast, especially in Asia and Latin America. Between 
1961 and 2004, yields in Asia rose at an average rate of 2.8 percent, an outcome largely 
explained by the adoption of high-yielding varieties and the intensive use of fertilizer. In 
other parts of the world, results were less impressive.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, growth per 
capita of the agricultural population (which is a broad measure of agricultural income) 
was less than half the growth rate in other regions. Whereas agricultural growth in Asia 
and, to a lesser extent, Latin America was driven by intensification, agriculture in Sub-
Saharan Africa grew mostly as a response to land expansion and yields have been 
stagnant. Since the potential for land expansion will soon be exhausted, further 
agricultural growth will have to come from increased yields. 
During the 1960s, rural development programs included the diffusion of 
technology to smallholders through government agencies, as well as community 
development in which members of communities were given joint responsibility to 
manage their community resources. Self-help efforts were encouraged and villagers were 
supposed to establish their own development plans—involving infrastructure, education 
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and agricultural improvements—while outside experts provided advice and grants. These 
early attempts at rural development failed because communities were not given additional 
resources, old power structures persisted, and traditional elites prevented these programs 
from reaching the poor (Holdcroft 1978). As GDP growth in developing countries slowed 
during the 1970s, it became clear that growth was not trickling down automatically to the 
poor. The focus of rural development approaches shifted toward poverty reduction.
46 
The leading approach to achieve this goal in rural areas became Integrated Rural 
Development (IRD) intended to focus directly on the poor, and supported by IDA (as 
well as by USAID). The programs had a twin objective: improving agricultural 
productivity and satisfying basic needs through health or education services (Staatz and 
Eicher 1978). Again, the state played the central role in delivering public goods as well as 
subsidized inputs, credit or extension services. In the aggregate, IRD programs were not 
successful. A well-known Bank publication of the 1970s reviewed 17 IRD projects in 
Africa and concluded that the main reasons were that they did not incorporate local 
technical expertise, emphasize local institutions, and understand the constraints faced by 
small farmers. Moreover, most projects were too costly to be sustainable beyond the pilot 
phase. Other factors that led to the disappointing performance of IRD programs were the 
urban bias of price policies, the lack of access to land and other assets and the lack of 
participation in the projects by beneficiaries.
47 The support for IRD—by both 
governments and major donors like the World Bank—decreased sharply in the early 
1980s. These donors shifted their focus to extension, roads or education projects—which 
had previously been specific rural development areas and were now dealt with in 
isolation (Binswanger 1998). 
48 
During the 1980s, rural development approaches also shifted toward more 
“market oriented” solutions and public interventions in rural areas diminished—in line 
with the neo-liberal belief that free-market forces would eliminate distortions and reduce 
poverty. But smallholders were falling behind: they were not in a position to adapt to the 
new market rules and the private provision of services could not easily replace their 
public provision due to information and market failures, in particular in credit and 
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insurance markets, preventing smallholders from adopting new technology and 
internalizing the benefits. 
Today’s understanding of rural development (embodied in part in the concept of 
“Community Driven Development”) is that both market liberalization and strong 
institutions are essential. The role for the state is to strengthen property rights and legal 
institutions; supply public goods such as R&D for agriculture, basic education or rural 
roads; address the various risk faced by the vulnerable rural poor through targeted safety 
net policies; and invest in communication and information systems, support farmer 
associations, input or credit subsidies or extension services. Given the possible capture of 
policy benefits by rich rural élites, decentralizing governance and empowerment—to 
increase access to local information, mobilization of social capital for effective 
cooperation, participation in the decision-making process, and accountability of elected 
officials—might be important for successful rural development strategies.  
 
Policy­Based Lending 
The long boom of the 1960s came to an end in the early 1970s.  Growth began 
slowing in many developing countries as policy induced distortions and inefficiencies 
took their toll.  The shock inflicted by the oil crisis of 1973 was enough to precipitate a 
downturn by curtailing the demand for primary commodities and light manufactures from 
the industrialized countries, which were hard hit, and by sharply rising energy costs.
49  
Growth and development slowed in many countries and went into reverse in some, with 
Sub-Saharan Africa being the worst affected not just by economic hardships, but also by 
a parallel upsurge in political turbulence and civil conflicts, exacerbated (or caused) by 
the rivalries of the superpowers locked in a lengthy “Cold War.” Developing countries 
were subjected to severe external shocks. Increases in oil prices and grain prices, world-
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wide inflation, high interest rates, floating exchange rates, low and unstable prices for all 
export commodities, and the interruption or reduction of commercial borrowing put an 
unprecedented strain on most developing economies. The recession experienced by those 
economies starting in 1979 was the most severe since the Second World War. Average 
growth rates of output were minuscule during 1979-1983. The performance was 
particularly bleak in 1983, above all in Africa and Latin America. 
Adjustment lending emerged in the 1980s to fill a real need. First, adjustment 
loans were an attempt to move beyond individual projects. In a highly inflationary global 
environment, many developing countries suffered from macroeconomic instability and 
structural problems that undermined growth and made project assistance ineffective. 
Second, adjustment lending was aimed at helping countries undertake reforms and 
smooth the transition costs of adjusting to economic shocks. The impact of the 
deterioration in the terms of trade, the reduced foreign demand for exports, and 
international interest rate increases would be felt in the short run and the long run. 
External shocks directly affect national income by reducing demand, both demand for 
exports and domestic demand, and indirectly by reducing output below the capacity of 
the economy to produce because it is dependent on imported inputs for the purchase of 
which no foreign exchange is available. "Normal" corrective measures required foreign 
financing, and commercial banks were reluctant to increase their lending to developing 
countries. In the international architecture of the early 1980s, there were some 
mechanisms enabling governments to bridge the gap temporarily, but no internationally 
agreed-upon mechanism considers the case of permanent balance-of-payments 
difficulties. In this case, only painful adjustments can solve the problem. In the North-
South world system, international mechanisms required the countries suffering from 
balance-of-payments deficits to operate the adjustments in their economies. The deficit of 
the South had its counterpart in the surplus of the North. In industrialized countries, 
which enjoy much higher standards of living, adjustments would be much less painful 
than in developing nations. 
Between 1961 and 1981, a tenth of IDA’s lending (about US$2.9 billion) was not 
tied to any particular projects.  These “program credits” could be disbursed rapidly and 37 
 
were intended to ease severe foreign exchange constraints.  They were accompanied by 
policy advice aimed at improving a country’s overall performance.
50 They were generally 
linked to the industrialization program of the country.  India received about half of the 
total for 11 industrial import programs. In the 1980s the program credits became much 
more systematic and the transfer of resources from IDA became more coordinated with 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby agreements. The intervention of the World 
Bank and the IMF was predicated on whether the shock was of a temporary or a 
permanent nature. If the shock resulting in balance-of-payments difficulties is temporary, 
so that sufficient external resources make it possible to keep both real consumption and 
real investment at their pre-shock level, there is traditionally a case for the IMF to make 
those resources available to the country until the situation reverses itself. If the shock 
permanently affects the terms on which the country interacts with the international 
economy, there is no presumption that finance will automatically be made available to 
ease the effects of these shocks. There are resources on which countries in difficulty can 
lay claim but the rule here is not automaticity but conditionality. The approval of the loan 
is made conditional on the acceptance by the country of a stabilization program to operate 
adjustments in the domestic economy, negotiated between the IMF staff and the 
economic policy team of the country, called a stand-by agreement.   
Adjustments are required if previous projections concerning consumption, 
investment, and income level are to be realized in the medium to long run. Adjustment 
lending (and stand-by loans from the IMF) was mostly aimed at improving the 
macroeconomic conditions of a country through broad liberalization measures, with 
appropriate policies typically enforced through loan conditions. The focus on macro 
stability and drastic interventions was a response to the sorry state of many economies, 
which took on massive debts, thanks to recycled petrodollars, and continued to spend as 
they had in the commodities boom of the 1970s.   
The results generated by adjustment lending were mixed. On the one hand, there 
was an improvement in developing countries’ policies. Better macroeconomic policies 
and greater openness have improved the economic environments of these countries. 
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Inflation, which typically does the greatest harm to poor people, fell significantly during 
the 1990s; at the same time, macroeconomic management improved, exchange rates were 
more stable, and trade barriers were reduced. But there was little progress in governance, 
controlling corruption, and quality of institutions worldwide—as measured by the 
governance component of the World Bank’s CPIA index—although there is significant 
variation across countries. On the other hand, adjustment was, by and large, a failure in 
terms of growth. As shown by Easterly (1985), none of the top 20 recipients of repeated 
adjustment lending over 1980-99 were able to achieve reasonable growth and contain all 
policy distortions. About half of the adjustment loan recipients showed severe 
macroeconomic distortions regardless of cumulative adjustment loans. Econometric tests 
fail to show that adjustment lending has any positive effect on policies or growth. 
51 This 
is also a conclusion reached by several internal OPCS reports. 
52  
Thus, despite good intentions, the record of adjustment lending by IDA (and by 
IBRD and the IMF) in the 1980s and 1990s is mixed at best. To be sure, it includes a 
number of success stories. But it also includes cases where adjustment programs were 
misguided or not followed. First, heavy reliance on conditionality was usually ineffective, 
with the large number of conditions doing nothing to strengthen borrower ownership of 
the reforms. Second, while the focus on improving poor policies was understandable, the 
design of adjustment programs paid inadequate attention to governance and institutional 
problems, which were major constraints on the investment climate. Finally, there was too 
little emphasis on equity issues and mitigating the social costs of adjustment. This was 
probably because many of the poor policies that adjustment lending targeted were both 
inefficient and biased against poor people. Nevertheless, the lack of specific attention to 
poverty issues led to progress involving damage to poor people and understandably 
attracted heavy criticism. 
Although conditionality can support policy changes, it cannot persuade reluctant 
reformers. The number and frequency of conditions attached to adjustment loans and 
                                                 
51 William Easterly 2005  
52  See Adjustment Lending Retrospective, June 15, 2001; Review of World Bank Conditionality, 
September 2005; Conditionality in Development Policy Lending, November 15, 2007, and  2009 
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standby agreements from international financial institutions have little to do with whether 
policies are reformed. Case studies have shown that effective policy reform generally 
emerges from domestic political consensus—and conditionality from donors does not 
help, and sometimes hurts, consensus building. There can be exceptions in the cases of 
‘‘stroke-of-the-pen’’ reforms (such as exchange rate adjustments), where only a small 
number of decision makers need to be convinced of the benefits of a policy change. But 
even in these cases, policy reforms risk reversal if they do not command broad support.  
The World Bank use of conditions has fallen significantly since the late 1980s, 
and the content of conditionality has shifted from short-term economic adjustments to 
institutional reforms in social sectors and public sector governance (World Bank, 2005 
and 2007).
53  The World Bank (as well as the IMF) reduced the number of conditions 
attached to their loans to developing countries—while it increased the emphasis on 
“country ownership [of its policy reforms]” and jointly monitorable results. Development 
policy lending replaced adjustment lending in 2004. The overhaul reflected the need for 
streamlining conditionality and the Bank's acknowledgement that there is no single 
blueprint for reform that will work in all countries. The shift by donors toward ex post 
conditionality—that is, aid based on jointly monitored results rather than promises—is a 
simple recognition of what they have learned from the political economy of reform, 
especially in former socialist economies in transition.
54 Domestic ownership (and 
domestic leadership) is essential. Successful reforms are those where government 




In the 1980s, development approaches stressed improving policy, particularly in 
macroeconomics and trade, and “getting prices right” by removing government-imposed 
barriers to markets. The end of the Cold War—which meant that dictatorial regimes did 
not need to be supported politically and economically for foreign policy reasons—opened 
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up the discussion of governance.  This coincided with new research on institutions, and 
gradually there was a shift in much of the policy content of IDA operations toward 
governance in Public Expenditure Reviews and Public Sector Reform Credits.  The 
interest in institutions and governance was awakened for four reasons.  
First, the failure of structural adjustment programs to spark growth in many low-
income countries in the 1980s focused attention on the role of institutions and governance 
in development.  
Second, and perhaps most important, the end of the Cold War removed self-
imposed blinders from the eyes of donor countries. Until the early 1990s, the United 
States and its allies had refrained from scrutinizing the governance failings of proxy 
states, for fear of undermining what they saw as the bulwark against communist 
expansion. But with the demise of the Soviet Union, both developed-country donors and 
developing-country citizens decried poor governance as a hindrance to development.  
Third, the transition in the economies of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union 
in the early and mid-1990s—which was far more difficult than many observers had 
expected—underlined the great importance of the institutional foundations for markets 
and good policy.  
Fourth, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 showed that even where 
policies had supported rapid growth and poverty reduction, weaknesses in institutional 
and governance foundations could threaten the whole edifice of development progress.  
In the literature there was increasing evidence linking dismal growth and poverty 
to corruption, waste, and authoritarian practices in government.  For example, in a survey 
of more than a century of comparative development experience in 40 developing 
countries, Reynolds (1983) wrote that “the single most important explanatory variable [of 
development] is political organization and the administrative competence of 
government.”
55  The contributions, in economic theory, of Douglass North and Oliver 
Williamson, and the literature on reform and political economy gave this new field a 
solid basis.
56 
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The core idea behind this new thinking about institutions and governance is as 
follows. Institutions, laws and decisions made by public officials — policies and 
regulations — define incentives for economic agents and affect the allocation of 
investment and public expenditure.  Of the total GDP produced by a country, part is used 
for government expenditure.  From total GDP produced by the private sector, subtract 
public expenditure to obtain net potential production.  It is potential because of 
deadweight welfare losses created by taxation and rents.  The resources available to 
government from taxation or public borrowing are used for the provision of public goods 
or for redistribution (transfers), or are siphoned off in the form of rents captured by 
agents exploiting a monopolistic position (information or discretionary power).  The 
”cost of government,” including the cost of enforcing rights, is a function of the 
deadweight losses created by taxation and rents, the costs of providing public goods 
(costs which should be measured in terms of outcomes such as illiteracy, infant mortality, 
schooling achievements, or quality of infrastructure) and transfers, and the productivity 
of transfers.  Governments play an essential role in facilitating, or hindering, the growth 
of output in several ways, for example by improving inputs such as human capital or by 
increasing, through the creation of new institutions, the efficiency with which inputs are 
used.  Government is partly endogenous to the process of economic growth.   
  Hirschmann (1970) showed that governments are principally disciplined by the 
exercise of voice, while markets create managerial discipline and induce efficiency 
through the exercise of choice.  Consumers can choose not to consume; shareholders can 
sell their shares, but citizens’ options with regard to public goods are more limited.  
Citizen preferences are not linked to taxes or revenue for public services because taxation 
is ultimately coercive.  Government performance is induced through other channels than 
is market performance, including accountability, transparency, and the rule of law 
(Brautigam, 1992).  Under given historical circumstances, informational, transactional 
and political constraints on government activity can lead to the creation of efficient (or 
inefficient) incentive schemes and institutions that produce welfare increasing 
(decreasing) outcomes.  42 
 
Wealthy economies developed under a variety of policy regimes, from fairly 
liberal (Taiwan, China or the United States) to fairly statist (Japan, Sweden). But they all 
passed a threshold of institutional quality that ensured political and economic stability, 
reasonable state capacity, enforcement of property rights and contracts, sufficient 
provision of public goods, and limits on government predation and corruption. In 
contrast, many countries with poor institutions and weak governance are beset by poorly 
designed and weakly implemented policies, shoddy infrastructure and public services, 
and state harassment of citizens and business. Legal systems are neither effective nor 
predictable. Contracts are only weakly enforceable. And crime is widespread. Police 
extract money from citizens they are supposed to protect. Public officials steal public 
funds rather than provide public goods. They distribute contracts, licenses, and jobs to 
their friends and political supporters—or sell them outright. And they demand bribes for 
services, denying the neediest. The transition to capitalism in China is the more 
fascinating, and still somewhat contested, story.
57 Most people will agree that, while the 
Chinese Communist Party retains the monopoly of power, much of the economy is no 
longer a command economy, with the market mechanism being the major allocator of 
resources. About 95 percent of consumer prices are now market-determined, although the 
state still controls prices in some key sectors (like financial services, telecoms, utilities 
and energy). But is the economy primarily capitalist now, with private owners of capital 
providing the dominant mode of organizing social and economic life through their drive 
for profit-making and accumulation? The answer is still somewhat ambiguous. It is not 
easy to classify Chinese firms by their ownership or to distinguish between private 
control rights and other forms of public or semi-public control rights or to trace their 
varying shares in a firm. Some evidence suggests that the private sector now contributes 
more than half of industrial value added (although not of fixed capital investments). The 
convoluted nature of private ownership is, of course, part of the legacy of the 
development of the Chinese private sector under the shadow of the state. As late as 1988, 
private firms with more than 8 employees were not permitted. Many private firms 
operated below the radar and used various subterfuges and covert deals with local 
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officials, as they adapted themselves to the changing permissible mores. Some of them 
used to be called “red-hat capitalists,” sometimes hiding under the façade of local 
collectives. Many of the smaller and regional state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were 
privatized and often their managers became the new owners. Currently about one-third of 
the private entrepreneurs are members of the Party (including xiahai entrepreneurs who 
are former officials); membership helps them to get state finance, and more protection 
and legitimacy. Of course, it is well-known that many of the entrepreneurs are in fact 
friends or relatives of Party officials. Many SOEs are controlled by powerful political 
families. One of China’s most respected economists, Jinglian Wu, has described all this 
as “crony capitalism.” There is a new political-managerial class that, over the last two 
decades, has converted their positions of authority into wealth and power. The vibrancy 
of entrepreneurial ambitions combined with the arbitrariness of power in an authoritarian 
state has sometimes given rise to particularly corrupt or predatory forms of capitalism, 
unencumbered by the restraints of civil society institutions. The state is still predominant 
in the producer goods sectors and in transportation and finance. The state still controls the 
larger and often more profitable (high-margin, more monopolistic) companies in the 
industrial and service sectors. Some of the SOEs are now important players in the global 
market competition. They are often highly commercialized: in recruiting professional 
managers, broadening their investor base, and shedding their traditional social and 
political obligations, many SOEs do not conform to the usual stereotypes. Nevertheless, it 
is probably correct to say that, while the Party can undo individual capitalists at short 
notice, it will be much more difficult for the leadership to unravel a whole network of 
capitalist relations, by now thickly overlaid with various vested interests and knotted with 
guanxi ties. Individual entrepreneurs have a clientelistic relationship with the state, but 
the state, for all its relative autonomy, is now sufficiently enmeshed in a profit-oriented 
system that has been identified with legitimacy-enhancing international economic 
prowess and nationalist glory, a tiger that the political leadership may find difficult to 
dismount. Even at the local level, the central leadership finds it difficult to rein in its own 
local officials who in collusion with local business commit some of the worst capitalist 
excesses (in land acquisitions, product safety violations or toxic pollution).  44 
 
  Weak institutions are not only an inequitable burden on citizens—they also act as 
a brake on economic growth by undermining incentives in the private sector. Businesses 
in poor countries face much larger regulatory burdens than those in rich countries. They 
face three times the administrative costs, and nearly twice as many bureaucratic 
procedures and longer delays. And they have fewer than half the protections of property 
rights of rich countries. Most of these failings do not show up on standard 
macroeconomic measures of performance, yet they are inimical to development. Societies 
with weak institutions have not developed the basis for complex economic interactions; 
they have neither the software nor the hardware for development. The result is 
dysfunctional markets, weak competitive pressures, and private sectors dependent on 
government cronyism and corruption. Incentives are misaligned, so that entrepreneurial 
individuals “invest” their time and resources in competing for rents from the political 
system. Social norms form around clientelism, rent-seeking, and factional competition, 
rather than social cohesion and progress. These destructive norms become rational for the 
individual, despite their negative collective effect, and they often prove difficult to 
unravel.  
  The breakdown in governance, erosion of institutions, and collapse of social 
cohesion are typically associated with a radical decline in living standards and rise in 
inequality—as experienced by low-income countries. Heavy regulation and weak 
property rights exclude the poor from doing business.  
The institutions of developed economies vary greatly, whether in regulation, 
social protection or labor markets. Even the meta-institution of democratic governance 
does not have unambiguous effects. The formal institutions of democracy do not always 
ensure checks on weak governance. Nor are these checks always absent in authoritarian 
regimes. Contrasting experiences in less democratic East Asian countries in the 1970s 
and more democratic African ones in the 1990s illustrate that mechanisms of 
accountability can take varying forms, defying a simple classification of formal political 
institutions. Not only are successful institutions highly varied in structure, but their 
origins are complex as well. Institutions are highly endogenous: they are not easily 
manipulated by governments as exogenous levers, but instead arise and evolve in 
historical contexts. These factors make the analysis of institutions a great challenge, one 45 
 
that development studies have just begun to grapple with seriously. But the recognition of 
the central role of institutions and governance itself marks a major advance in 
development thinking.  
How IDA views governance has evolved and new types of analytical reports and 
studies have been produced. This has improved the quality of its lending as measured by 
the ratings of the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank.  The 
traditional Public Expenditure Reviews done by Bank/IDA staff have been expanded to 
include institutional issues, such as the policy formulation process, independence of 
national audit offices, and detailed assessments such as Country Procurement Assessment 
Review (CPAR) and Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) have 
become “core diagnostic” work for IDA.
58  In some cases IDA undertook governance 
reviews and these have influenced IDA’s project preparation process. IDA has also 
teamed up with other development partners in the preparation of Public Expenditure 
Framework Assessments (PEFA), a benchmarking exercise for public resource and 
budget management that is comparable across countries. At the same time, this line of 
work has shown that understanding how governance related processes and reforms 
worked is far from complete. New research has also pointed out the importance of legal 
frameworks and enforcement issues for which IDA has no direct instruments. As noted 
by Deaton, “reforming governance and institutions is a much taller order than building a 
water delivery system or even a petrochemical plant.”  Indeed governance-related 
reforms are frontier areas for IDA and successful transitions to sound governance would 
need to originate from within countries. Outside expertise can only play a supportive role.    
 
Rise of Governance Lending.  Part of this was the shift in the nature of non-project 
finance from policy conditionality toward governance-related measures. These 
constituted about half of all conditions in Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs).   
                                                 
58  During the 2000s, IDA required a “minimum package” of economic reporting for IDA countries ESW, 
including PERs and CFAAs.  The CFAA was formally designated as an economic and sector work (ESW) 
product of the World Bank in July 2000 (see CFAA guidelines 2003).  This caused an increase in the share 
of budget-related and fiduciary work.  The fact that some IDA countries were also Highly Indebted (HIPC) 
countries also played a role in this increase since donors wanted to know where the debt relief was going.   
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Projects supported by IDA are now required to carry out national poverty-reduction 
strategies. The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), which governs the 
development of these strategies, was presented to the World Bank Board of Governors in 
1998. The framework spells out four principles, all of which mark significant shifts in 
thinking about development since the 1990s:  
     Development strategies should be comprehensive and shaped by a long-term vision. 
In the past, development strategies emphasized short-term macroeconomic stabilization 
and balance-of-payments corrections. The CDF stresses longer-term structural and social 
considerations, such as expanding and improving education and health facilities, 
maintaining infrastructure, and training a new generation of public officials.  
     Each country should devise and direct its own development agenda based on citizen 
participation. The CDF holds that when countries “own” reforms, governments and their 
citizens are more committed to seeing them through.  
     Governments, donors, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders should 
work together in partnership led by recipient countries to carry out development 
strategies. Partnerships built on transparency, mutual trust and consultation can increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of aid, and help countries increase their capacity to 
develop and carry out a wide variety of programs.  
     Development performance should be evaluated on the basis of measurable results. 
Traditionally, the Bank tended to concentrate on disbursement levels and project inputs in 
evaluating development efforts, an approach that measured only resource allocation and 
consumption. The CDF emphasizes that evaluation should focus on the impact of aid on 
people and their needs.  
In 2001, the boards of the World Bank and the IMF adopted the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy process (PRSP). This process became the basic springboard for all 
low-income country access to expanded debt relief, and then to the concessional funding 
windows of the two institutions – the International Development Association (IDA) and 
the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The PRSP proved to be a 
helpful vehicle for integrating development efforts across sectors and development 
partners. As a result, some major bilateral donors shifted from stand-alone projects 
toward multiyear, multi-donor projects and programs with the flexibility to direct 47 
 
resources toward reforms across a significant part of the economy. The process is hailed 
as an advance on previous aid-delivery mechanisms for three reasons. 
First, it is supposed to be country owned. Each strategy is developed by the 
government of the recipient country and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is 
discussed by political parties and major groups in society through a participatory process. 
Second, it is supposed to be a vehicle for coordination and harmonization among 
donors and reduces the costs of donor fragmentation. The World Bank, the IMF and the 
main donors (EU Commission, DfID, etc.) support the PRSP. In many countries, the PRS 
process has become the main forum for donor coordination.  
Finally, it provides aid with a consistent policy framework and represents a move 
away from project-based assistance. Countries that have a demonstrated track record of 
serious economic reforms receive aid in the form of direct budget support (through 
Poverty Reduction Support Credits and the like). To provide accountability, the PRSP 
identifies clear targets for results and monitors progress toward them. The PRSP process, 
while continuing the tradition of structural adjustment, represents a move away from 
excessive conditionality. As of 2007, 62 countries had implemented PRSPs (or interim 
PRSPs) and a third of those were on their second PRSPs.  Some 21 fragile states have had 
PRSPs (4 had a PRS-II, 10 a PRS-I, and 7 had an Interim PRS).  
Because of selectivity, IDA assistance is more focused on “willing reformers” 
articulating a development vision through the PRS process (poor countries with relatively 
good institutions and policies) and donors have attempted to lighten conditionality and 
mainly support measures included in the country’s PRSP.
59 The change to a more 
country-owned process has not been trivial. There is a difference between a voluntary, 
country-owned statement of priorities (the PRSP) and a mandatory, externally driven 
judgment about its quality and feasibility (Rogerson et al 2004). The two are notionally 
separate—the government “owns” its strategy and the donors “own” their independent 
assessments of the strategy and resulting aid allocations—even if, in practice, different 
                                                 
59 In the IMF’s PRGF also, conditionality has become more parsimonious, focused on the Fund’s core 
areas of expertise, and limited to measures that have a direct and critical impact on the program's 
macroeconomic objectives.  48 
 
power relationships and local chemistry determine how much one actually influences the 
other. It is too soon to evaluate this evolution in the way of delivering aid.  
Can conditionality be avoided?  As long as a transaction has a lender and a 
borrower, it is inevitable.
60 It may be implicit or explicit, narrow or expansive, but it 
cannot be wished away. Still, conditionality as it was applied in the 1980s and 1990s was 
excessive and failed to deliver results. Are there alternatives? Greater emphasis on 
country ownership of programs as envisaged in the PRSP process and peer-monitoring 
mechanisms like the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) are steps in 
the right direction. It is also important that there be a separation of powers between the 
agencies that lend money and impose conditions and those that monitor compliance. As 
long as the actions of lenders separate risks from (political and financial) rewards, they 
will induce a “conditionality moral hazard.” Conditionalities are incomplete contracts and 
there are inherent limitations to what the instrument can achieve. Kapur (2004) suggests 
as a drastic change to institute broad ranging risk sharing contracts between individual 
poor countries and rich countries, mediated through IDA and other international financial 
institutions. What is needed is a strategy based on an explicit typology of developing 
countries (Temple 2010). Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) argue that current policies 
increasingly amount to a three-track model. Countries with good governance and policies 
receive budget support; intermediate countries face something more like traditional 
conditionality, but with greater emphasis on governance and performance; and fragile 
states are aided through a combination of humanitarian assistance and aid that bypasses 
the state, for example, by allocation to NGOs.
61 
Balance of payments support was mentioned as a motivation for program lending 
in the early 1980s.  Increasingly, in the 2000s, budget support has been mentioned as a 
motivation.  Budget support is a method of financing a developing country’s budget 
through a transfer of non-earmarked resources from IDA (or other donor agencies) to the 
recipient government’s national treasury. This is contrasted with project approaches in 
which aid is tied to the creation of discrete development projects or provision of specific 
                                                 
60 Kapur, Devesh. 2004. “Conditionality and its Alternatives.” In Inge Kaul and Pedro Conceição, eds., 
Public Finance in a Globalizing World. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
61 See also Temple (2010) and Koeberle et al. (2005)  49 
 
technical assistance services, often undertaken outside regular budgetary systems. It is a 
direct consequence of the findings from the economic literature concerning fungibility. 
The share of budget support in total aid commitments is around 5-7 percent of 
total ODA today.  By contrast, sector program support (i.e., aid contributions to a defined 
sector such as agriculture, education or transport) has increased greatly—nearly tripling 
between 2003 and 2004. Low-income countries received the lion’s share (63 percent) of 
total general budget and sector program support, two examples of fast-disbursing aid.  
And, during 2001-2004, low-income countries were the main beneficiaries of 







Measuring the effectiveness of IDA projects and programs means collecting 
evidence about which policies really work in a given economic, social and political 
setting. Although earlier the success of IDA operations was measured in terms of rates of 
return on projects, increasingly results are measured using impact evaluation methods. 
“Donors are shooting in the dark because they refuse to collect solid evidence on what 
works,” says Angus Deaton.  Researchers both in academia and at the World Bank have 
increasingly been focusing on impact evaluations to complement more traditional 
                                                 
62  See Development Committee, “Aid Architecture: an Overview of the Main Trends in Official 
Development Assistance Flows.” Document DC2007-0003, March 29, 2007 50 
 
assessments.  This line of research has revived the issue of the “micro-macro paradox.”  
In a famous paper, Mosley (1987) suggested that, while foreign aid seemed to be 
effective at the microeconomic level, its aggregate or macro impact was much more 
difficult to identify. Indeed, analyses of the impact of aid on growth based on cross-
country regressions produce mixed results but there is evidence that multilaterals and 
bilateral donors have successfully implemented individual projects. Thus the “micro-
macro debate” continues.  The consensus among researchers is now that macro and cross-
country level results should be complemented by micro impact evaluation studies to yield 
a balanced assessment. Taking this approach, for example, Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010) 
find that aid has a positive and significant but moderate effect on growth.   
Impact evaluation differs from the internal evaluation efforts carried out at the 
World Bank by various units, including QAG (quality at entry) and IEG (ex post 
evaluation).  While the latter evaluate processes, assess whether projects have reached 
their intended objectives and document changes in specific outcomes, impact evaluations 
(carried out in the Research Department or other units of the Bank, or in universities 
around the world) evaluate the development impact of a project on its target population 
(e.g., on poverty or health outcomes) by comparing the observed outcomes to a 
counterfactual (i.e., what the situation would have been if the program had not been 
undertaken). Impact evaluations are a scientific means of establishing causal links 
between interventions and outcomes and constitute a key input to determining cost-
effective approaches to development.  Aid would become much more effective if projects 
took into consideration the results of studies based on such rigorous methods.   
IDA has gradually changed its approach to measurement from measuring inputs 
used for development projects to measuring outcomes, i.e., from public resources spent 
on inputs to outcome indicators (such as illiteracy rates, morbidity, infant mortality, 
school achievements, infrastructure characteristics, etc.).  One reason is easily 
understandable: since governments do not spend money equally effectively, these 
numbers per se tell us nothing about government efficiency.  Since the incentives to 
improve the quality and reduce the cost of public goods are stronger for private providers 
than for public ones, it is necessary to have data on both the quality and the quantity of 
output in order to compare public and private activities.  Quality characteristics can be 51 
 
handled in a qualitative dependent-variable framework, but some attributes such as effort 
may not be directly observable.   
As observed on many occasions and, more recently in the report of the Sen, 
Stiglitz, Fitoussi Commission created by President Sarkozy, although it is possible to 
measure physical productivity (output per unit of physical input) in relation to private 
goods, measuring productivity in relation to many public goods and to services provided 
by the public sector remains a challenge (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009).  We might find 
comparative data on the wages and labor needed to produce private and public goods, but 
what number of employees is appropriate for the production and provision of collective 
services, such as defense, maintenance of law and order, legislation and regulation, etc.?  
Since this problem is difficult to resolve, public sector accounts are based, in value terms, 
on the assumption that “the value of the final consumption of general government is 
taken to be equal to the value of the expenditures they incur on collective services”  (UN 
1993, paragraph 9.91, p.215).
63 
Development is now almost universally synonymous with poverty reduction, and 
absolute poverty is recognized as the inability to achieve basic standards in nutrition, 
health, education, environment, and a voice in the decisions affecting poor people’s lives. 
The 2000/2001 World Development Report articulates the multifaceted dimensions of 
poverty, emphasizing that social development carries intrinsic value in addition to 
whatever instrumental value it may have. Signaling this recognition, the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted in 2000 at the United Nations by the 
representatives of 191 countries. They commit the development community to work 
toward progress in the multiple dimensions of poverty reduction. 
IDA is now much more focused on achieving the desired results in terms of 
poverty reduction than on inputs (measuring “success” in terms of dollars or bags of 
wheat given to the government). But the systematic measurement of outcomes raises a 
number of methodological and practical questions that are still not resolved. 
                                                 
63 A problem arises when measuring outcomes that are unobservable, e.g., improvements in governance. 
Proxies are used in the governance literature, including in the now famous governance index constructed by 
Kraay and Kaufmann—either quantitative proxies (e.g. the number of changes in government as a gauge of 
‘political instability’) or qualitative variables (e.g. the subjective ranking of contract enforcement as a 
gauge of ‘institutional efficiency’).  52 
 
First, there is the question of which metrics to use.  For example, the kind of 
multidimensional picture of poverty found in the Millennium Development Goals is 
probably preferable than a one-dimensional measure like “$1 a day poverty” but it raises 
evaluation issues. MDGs were “decreed from above,” using the same goal for all 
countries regardless of their initial conditions, and not “from below” starting from what is 
achievable in each country.  As Clemens, Kenny and Moss (2004) have correctly pointed 
out, the fact that most MDGs will not be achieved by 2015 in low-income countries 
should not obscure the fact that development has progressed at unprecedented levels over 
the past 30 or more years. Thus, the MDGs create an unnecessary pessimism by labeling 
many development successes as failures. For example, in many IDA countries, the rates 
of progress required to meet the education and health MDGs are extremely high 
compared with the historical experience of the West.  And the costing has never been 
done properly.  There is no relationship between the desired outcomes and their cost—not 
to mention who should pay for these expenditures: the local population (domestic taxes) 
or aid (foreign taxes).   
Second, there is the issue of methodology.  An impact evaluation is an assessment 
of the performance of a program in attaining well-defined objectives against an explicit 
counterfactual, which is the absence of the program. It amounts to making causal 
inferences, answering a question of the type “How would participants in a given 
project/program have fared in the absence of the program?” Comparing the same 
individual over time will not, in most cases, give a reliable estimate of the program's 
impact since other factors that affect outcomes may have changed since the program was 
introduced. We cannot obtain an estimate of the impact of the program on a given 
individual but we can obtain the average impact of a policy or program on a group of 
individuals by comparing them with a similar group of individuals who were not exposed 
to the program. Purists will find that impact evaluation must be done through randomized 
evaluation (or at least using quasi-experimental methods).   
Programs are placed in specific areas (for example, poorer or richer areas). 
Individuals are screened for participation (for example, means tested) and the decision to 
participate in a program is often voluntary, creating self-selection. For all of these 
reasons, those who were not exposed to a treatment are often a poor comparison group 53 
 
for those who were. Any difference between the groups can be attributed to both the 
impact of the program, called the treatment, and pre-existing differences, called the 
selection bias.  Without a reliable way to estimate the size of this selection bias, the 
analyst cannot decompose the overall difference into a treatment effect and a bias term. 
The selection bias can be entirely eliminated when individuals or groups are randomly 
assigned to the treatment group and the comparison group. But most evaluations of aid 
projects are not randomized.   
In practice, organizations like IDA that routinely evaluate ex post the outcome of 
their projects use rather coarse methodologies that simply compare average outcomes 
between units that have the project (water and sanitation; feeder roads; schools, etc.) and 
those that do not in order to assess the impact of the change. But failure to control for 
differences in the pre-intervention characteristics of the participants and nonparticipants 
could severely bias such comparisons. Randomization can be a powerful tool to assess 
the impact of policies/interventions but, as Ravallion (2005) notes, it is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for a good evaluation—nor is it always feasible, notably for large public 
programs. Non-experimental econometric methods can be used instead of pure 
randomization. They exhibit biases but, with adequate data, they can produce excellent 
results that can be very useful for policy makers and other practitioners.  Many well-
known evaluations carried out in developing countries use non-experimental econometric 
methods.
64 They provide useful results that can be used by donors. They demonstrate that 
aid can greatly benefit from serious studies applying rigorous econometric techniques to 
evidence collected in the field. 
65 
Good methodology is not sufficient to produce good results.  A good evaluation 
requires an important involvement of the evaluator so that he/she understands well the 
design of the program, the context in which it is applied and how the program works on 
the ground.   Moreover, not all policies/programs and development issues are susceptible 
to being evaluated. Some development practices are susceptible to impact evaluation: 
generally speaking, human development policies (education, health or social policies; 
                                                 
64   See for example, Glewwe, Kremer, Moulin and Zitzewitz (2004), Galasso and Ravallion (2005), Duflo 
and Pande (2005), Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005), or Olken (2005). 
65  For references to this literature, see the websites of the World Bank’s Poverty Net Impact Evaluation 
and Development Impact Evaluation Initiative at http:/www.econ.worlbank.org    54 
 
environmental policies; taxation policies; etc. that have fairly well-defined target 
populations).  Other development practices—for example, public finance management 
reforms—that potentially have huge payoffs may be extraordinarily high.
 66 Even when 
policies are susceptible to impact evaluation, there are many concerns—both ethical and 
technical—about both the internal and the external validity of what research can unearth. 
Randomized evaluations, being “social experiments,” raise serious ethical concerns. 
Review boards, first created in 1974, were initially restricted to biomedical research. In 
1981 the regulations were revised to cover all research that involves human subjects and 
is designed to contribute to “generalizable” knowledge.   
We need to distinguish here between internal validity and external validity of 
impact evaluations. Issues of internal validity are concerned with the methodology of the 
experiment.  Does the design allow us to obtain a reliable estimate of the counterfactual 
outcomes in the specific context?  Issues of external validity are whether the results from 
a specific evaluation can be replicated in other places and periods.   
Developing countries have learned useful lessons from the policy advice given by 
IDA. Some policy lessons can be transplanted from rich to poor countries. To an extent, 
this is what successful East Asian countries have done—they have imported and adapted 
to local circumstances administrative practices and legal institutions, in some cases with 
assistance from IDA and other donors.
67   It is possible to transplant policy rules and 
regularities from one context to the next—so that we don’t have to reinvent the wheel 
every time we advise a different government—because we can expect some behaviors to 
be universal.  We know, for example, that food consumption will increase at low levels of 
                                                 
66  The crucial element to coordinate the strategies of different ministries within government, as well as to 
align the aid strategies of the various donors with the overall strategy of the government is the budget.  The 
failure to link policy, planning and budgeting is the single most important cause of poor budgeting 
outcomes in developing countries. See the IMF website on Public Financial Management http://blog-
pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2008/01/france-improvin.html.  
 
67   Pistor and Wellons (1998) discuss changes in legal institutions in Asian countries over 1960-1995. East 
Asian countries transplanted parts of Western law (competition law, environmental and consumer 
protection, intellectual property rights, securities and exchange regulations, etc) in response to specific 
crises (environmental disasters, misuse of monopoly power, etc.), often under political and/or financial 
pressure from foreigners. The economic “take-off” of the tiger countries went hand-in-hand with a 
strengthened role of the state, and legal change preceded the economic outcomes.  During the 1980s, policy 
changes prompted economic change which, in turn, gave rise to the demand for new legislation, and the 
repealing of numerous laws shifted control rights from the state to the market.   
 55 
 
income if income increases. We can use this “wisdom” as our prior until we have 
evidence that it is not the case in certain circumstances.  Some human behavior is 
universal and imprinted in the genes of all humanity but other types of behavior are 
culturally determined. Therefore some behavioral responses to a particular program or 
policy will not be the same. For instance, it is not clear that one can draw lessons from 
the Latin American experience with conditional cash transfers (there are CCT programs 
in almost every country) that are relevant for, say, rural Africa. 
The political dimension of policy is also important.  An evaluation should be able, 
at the very least, to distinguish between gainers and losers. For example, Lanjouw and 
Ravallion (1998) estimate the marginal odds for individuals of different income 
categories to participate in school and anti-poverty programs, using 1993-94 National 
Sample Survey data from rural India. Their results suggest that the benefits of these 
programs are captured early on by the non-poor. The lack of fiscal discipline (called the 
“soft budget constraint” by János Kornai) is an economic issue with political roots that is 
prevalent around the world.  It makes public expenditure management and 
macroeconomic control particularly difficult, because the state must be able to resist the 
pressure of interest groups, and greatly complicates the process of reforming governance. 
For example, there are enormous pressures to increase local expenditures to counteract 
growing unemployment and the closure of loss-making enterprises, not to mention other 
kinds of subsidies to friends and cronies. Such pressures can create problems in restoring 
fiscal discipline at the macroeconomic level. 
It is important to understand the heterogeneity of the impact of the program on 
various population groups. This is very relevant for the political economy of anti-poverty 
policies, or for privatization and restructuring of enterprises, since it may indicate the 
need for supplementary policies for better protecting the losers. For example, the 
foregone labor earnings incurred by participants in workfare or conditional cash transfer 
schemes (via the loss of earnings from child labor) will vary according to skills and local 
labor-market conditions. Heterogeneity of impacts in terms of observables is readily 
allowed for by adding interaction effects with the treatment dummy variable (Ravallion 
2005). 56 
 
Carrying out evaluations across different settings and at different scales can throw 
light on what influences the outcomes, whether it is politics, the behavior of elites, the 
capacity of local or national governments, or the presence or absence of social capital. 
68  
This is the objective of the DIME initiative of the World Bank, which includes many 
IDA-financed projects.  It is also essential to take into account positive or negative 
externalities of the project. A form of externality that is frequent is the fact that many 
donors often hire the best and most capable administrators away from their government 
jobs (where social returns to their labor are higher) to work in their PIU (project 
implementation unit). The extreme form of spillover effect is an economy-wide 
program—for which classic impact evaluation tools are inadequate since no explicit 
assignment process is evident and externalities are pervasive (Ravallion, 2005). 
Last but not least, when careful impact evaluation demonstrates that a particular 
policy is helpful for developing countries, the main problem is replication.  Even if the 
evaluation is externally valid so that, if replicated in other places and periods, similar 
results could be obtained, the issue is the practice of development by bilateral and 
multilateral donors that have a tendency to be subject to fashions and to produce 
development projects like sausages. 
Conclusions 
 
From this assessment of the influence of ideas on IDA operations, we can draw at 
least four useful conclusions. 
The World Bank, because of its organizational structure, which allows its staff to 
learn from its projects and policies (e.g., the presence of an ex post evaluation group 
drawing lessons from its activities), and because it has nurtured a cadre of good 
researchers, has been a major contributor to development economics through data, 
research and by fostering interactions between operational staff, policymakers and 
                                                 
68  Deaton (in Banerjee ed., 2007) writes that some types of evidence may not be useful outside of very 
specific circumstances. He cites as an example the famous Worms paper of Miguel and Kremer (2004) 
saying that “the results of one experiment in Kenya (in which there was in fact no randomization, only 
selection based on alphabetical order) hardly prove that de-worming is always the cheapest way to get kids 
into school” since the rate of re-infection depends on whether children wear shoes and whether they have 
access to toilets. 
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researchers. There have always been close connections between IDA and researchers 
interested in development economics. At least since the early 1970s, research on 
development has been informed by practice and, with continuous feedback from 
evaluation, IDA has been a learning institution. The operations prepared by IDA staff 
have integrated lessons and findings from research.  It is doubtful whether, without the 
influence of research and the close connections between research, policy advice and 
policy practice, IDA would have become a premier development organization.  
The World Bank has been a pioneer in the measurement of poverty and has 
conducted many surveys (household surveys or health and demography surveys).  Many 
advances, such as poverty mapping and research on equity, also originate with the World 
Bank. Research at the World Bank—with its close links with academia around the 
world—has been the interface and intermediary between cutting edge intellectual 
advances and informed operations. The Bank’s research staff—the quality of which, over 
the years, is attested by its rankings and citation counts—has excelled at publishing 
relevant research and helped their colleagues in other departments by participating in 
IDA/Bank operations.   
The allocation of IDA funds is an important area that has been influenced by 
changes in development thinking.  First, the dominant thinking on development has 
influenced IDA in terms of sector priorities, putting emphasis first on infrastructure and 
increasingly on agriculture, then in the 1980s on macroeconomic adjustment and policy 
reform, and finally in the 1990s on governance and institutional factors.   
Second, starting in the late 1980s, IDA assistance became less determined by 
political considerations and more subject to selectivity, i.e., the idea that assistance would 
have a greater impact on poverty reduction if it were focused on countries with stronger 
economic institutions and policies.  The formula now used by IDA attempts to balance 
needs and performance, and gives a lot of weight to governance.  Governance and 
institutions—increasingly viewed by economists as one of the major causes of 
underdevelopment—represent a real challenge for IDA, and it is not clear how much can 
be achieved. In the absence of direct instruments to reduce poverty, the Bank has sought 
to understand the institutional constraints blocking development governance through its 
PERs, PEIRs, CFAA, CPARs, governance reviews, and PEFAs, and has developed 58 
 
benchmarks that enable governments to make progress in their country along various 
dimensions of policy and governance.  
Third, there is a great divergence of outcomes across IDA countries and, in some 
of the countries, reforms have moved slowly—which is not surprising when one 
considers that it took European countries many years to become modern states. The main 
reason is that reform policy choices are not exogenous. They depend on both initial 
conditions and political reform, with political reform the most important determinant of 
the speed and comprehensiveness of economic liberalization. De Melo, Gelb, Denizer 
and Tenev (2001) have analyzed the interaction of various factors, including political 
change and reforms, for all transition countries, such as Eastern Europe, the former 
Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam, and found that initial conditions such as initial 
macroeconomic distortions and differences in economic structure and institutions jointly 
determine the large differences in economic performance. Initial conditions dominate in 
explaining inflation, but economic liberalization is the most important factor determining 
differences in growth. Economic liberalization has a negative contemporaneous impact 
but a stronger positive effect on performance over time. Macroeconomic and structural 
distortions are negatively related to both policy and performance. Unfavorable initial 
conditions discourage policy reforms but do not diminish their effectiveness once they 
are implemented. The influence of initial conditions diminishes over time. Monetary 
overhangs are dissipated through inflation, industrial overhang is eroded as plants shut 
down, and market memory returns through experience. 
Fourth, as noted by Rodrik (2007), first-order economic principles such as 
protection of property rights, market-based competition, appropriate incentives and sound 
monetary policy do not map into unique policy packages.  Each country requires a 
specific set of policies.  In this respect, IDA has been flexible—for instance, applying 
different policy advice to countries as diverse as China, India and the countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa—and has learned from the experience of countries with different 
institutional structure, following different reform paths—which has led to the adoption of 
different “packages” of policy for post-conflict countries, for countries with high 
indebtedness and for re-engaging countries. 
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